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TRIBUTE 
 
A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR 
PENNY WHITE 
 
E. Alan Groves* 
 
In August 2017, Professor Penny White1 stepped 
down from her position as faculty advisor to the 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy. On behalf of the 
journal’s editors, I write to express our warmest thanks 
and deepest appreciation for Professor White’s steadfast 
commitment to the journal and its members, both past 
and present.  
Professor White’s relationship with the Tennessee 
Journal of Law and Policy dates back to the journal’s 
founding in 2004 when she agreed to serve as one of the 
journal’s original faculty advisors. As a former Tennessee 
Supreme Court justice, a successful former litigator, and 
an accomplished academic, Professor White brought a 
wealth of experience to the journal. She shared this 
experience by helping the journal with fundraising, 
                                               
* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, The University of Tennessee 
College of Law. 
1 Penny White serves The University of Tennessee College of 
Law in three different capacities: She is the E.E. Overton 
Distinguished Professor of Law, the Director of the Center for 
Advocacy and Dispute Resolution, and the Interim Director of 
Clinical Programs.  
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article solicitation, and publishing a written work of her 
own.2 
Further, Professor White has been instrumental 
in allowing the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy to 
co-host an annual symposium with the College of Law’s 
Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution. Each year, 
the journal invites professionals from various academic 
disciplines to speak about contemporary issues in law 
and public policy. The annual symposium continues to 
ignite the imagination of the campus community and 
provides journal members with unique opportunities to 
interact with policy experts and well-respected members 
of the bench and bar. These annual events are made 
possible by the vision of Professor White, the 
administrative support of her assistant Jenny Lackey, 
and the financial support of the Center for Advocacy and 
Dispute Resolution. 
Finally, Professor White has served as a 
remarkable mentor and role model for the student editors 
of the journal. Students who have served as Editor in 
Chief or Symposium Editor have personally witnessed 
the time and energy Professor White has invested in the 
journal. These students have also witnessed the grace 
and humility with which Professor White conducts her 
daily affairs; she does not lord her titles over students or 
colleagues, and, no matter how busy she is, Professor 
White always makes time to meet with students in her 
office. To everyone on campus, Professor White is known 
for her strength, her integrity, and (most of all) her love 
for people.  
Thus, it is with sad hearts that the editors of the 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy bid farewell to our 
longtime faculty advisor. Of course, we will no doubt 
                                               
2 See generally Penny White, If it Ain’t Broke, Break it—How 
the Tennessee General Assembly Dismantled and Destroyed 
Tennessee’s Uniquely Excellent Judicial System, 10 TENN. J.L. 
& POL’Y 329 (2015). 
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continue to learn from Professor White in clinics and in 
the classroom, and we will forever be touched by the 
example of her life and her legacy in the law. Turning the 
page, we now look forward to continuing this journal’s 
tradition of excellence under the supervision of our 
current faculty advisor, Professor Bradley A. Areheart.    
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ARTICLE 
 
JUDICIAL HOT POTATO 
AN ANALYSIS OF BIFURCATED COURTS OF 
LAST RESORT IN TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA 
 
Brent M. Hanson* 
 
I. History 166 
   A. Texas 166 
      1. Pre-Civil War 166 
      2. Reconstruction 167 
         a. Constitution of Texas (1866) 168 
                                               
* Brent M. Hanson received his Juris Doctor from the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, magna cum laude. He 
also holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from 
California State University, Fresno, summa cum laude. He 
currently practices commercial and securities litigation in 
Houston, Texas as an Associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom LLP. He has graciously accepted a clerkship 
with the Honorable Leslie H. Southwick of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 2018. He would like to thank 
his wife, Kyle Hanson, for all her support; his professors Amy 
Wax and Cathy Struve, who provided much needed direction, 
criticism, and guidance; and the editors of the Tennessee 
Journal of Law and Policy for their diligent work and helpful 
suggestions. The views expressed in this Article are his own, 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of Skadden Arps or any 
one or more of its clients, nor do they necessarily reflect the 
views of Judge Southwick. 
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         a. 1891 Amendment 172 
         b. Trial Courts in Texas 173 
         c. Amendments Since 1891 Regarding the Structure 
and Function of the Appellate Courts  
in Texas 175 
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III. Attempts to Eliminated Bifurcated Courts 201 
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On April 29, 2014, Clayton Lockett was executed 
by lethal injection in Oklahoma.1 Lockett was convicted 
of murdering nineteen-year-old Stephanie Neiman, 
whom he shot twice with a shotgun and then buried while 
still alive, with the help of his accomplices.2 Of his own 
volition,3 Lockett confessed three days later and was 
subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. Lockett’s 
death resulted from a botched lethal injection.4 The drugs 
                                               
1 Jeffrey E. Stern, The Cruel and Unusual Execution of Clayton 
Lockett, THE ATLANTIC (June 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2015/06/execution-clayton-lockett/392069/. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 See id. (“Governor Fallin gave a press conference to remind 
everyone about Lockett’s crimes, voice her support for the 
12
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used to execute Lockett were both confidential and 
experimental.5 The intravenous line (“IV”) used to render 
Lockett unconscious was pulled from his vein and became 
infiltrated, and much of the lethal drugs did not make it 
into Lockett’s bloodstream.6 As a result, Lockett awoke 
and sat up on the gurney in the middle of his execution, 
unable to speak, with blood pooling beneath him caused 
by the infiltrated IV.7 The execution was botched to such 
a level that the warden actually tried to stop it, 
eventually calling and briefing the governor on the 
situation.8 However, there were already enough drugs in 
Lockett’s system; he died ten minutes later, apparently 
in agony the entire time.9 
 Prior to this incident, on April 23, 2014, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court dissolved a stay of execution 
and rendered a per curiam opinion that resulted in 
Lockett’s execution.10 Lockett v. Evans is the result of 
more than ten years of interrelated appeals and 
constitutional challenges, spanning federal courts of 
appeals and state courts of last resort.11 Lockett’s later 
appeals, challenging a lethal injection disclosure 
prohibition statute, also included Charles Warner, a man 
                                               
death penalty, and announce an investigation into what had 
gone wrong.”). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. (“Ten minutes later, at 7:06 p.m., Clayton Lockett was 
declared dead. He had been dying amidst all the chaos, just 
very slowly and in apparent agony.”). 
10 Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 492 (Okla., 2014) (“The stay 
of execution entered by this Court on April 21, 2014, is hereby 
dissolved.”). 
11 See, e.g., Lockett v. Trammel, 711 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2013); 
Lockett v. Workman, No. CIV-03-734-F, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
157157 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 2011); Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d 
58 (Okla. 2014); Warner v. State, 29 P.3d 569 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2001). 
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facing execution for raping and murdering an eleven-
month-old baby.12 The state of Oklahoma executed 
Warner on January 15, 2015,13 after a 180-day stay of 
execution during which authorities investigated the 
botched execution of Lockett.14 Warner’s last words were, 
“My body is on fire.”15 
Warner’s and Lockett’s appeal process was unique 
because they challenged the constitutionality of a law 
that classified the lethal injection drugs used to execute 
them.16  If Warner and Lockett succeeded in their 
constitutional challenge, their executions would be 
stayed. In forty-eight states, there would be no question 
that a court of last resort could render a decision on the 
constitutionality of a lethal injection classification law. 
Oklahoma, however, is not one of them, due to its 
bifurcated court of last resort structure. The only other 
state that maintains a bifurcated structure of civil and 
                                               
12 Diana Baldwin, Man Found Guilty of Baby Rape, Murder, 
NEWSOK (June 24, 2003), http://newsok.com/man-found-
guilty-of-baby-rape-murder/article/1934580. 
13 Cary Aspinwall, Charles Warner is Executed, TULSA WORLD 
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/charles-
warner-is-executed-here-s-the-story-of-his/article_af39c542-
08d0-5bd6-80ac-01a6f1c668ee.html. 
14 Katie Fretland, Oklahoma Agrees to 180 Day Stay of 
Execution for Death-row Inmate, THE GUARDIAN (May 8, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/oklahoma-
180-day-stay-execution-charles-warner. The Oklahoma Court 
of Criminal Appeals issued the stay of execution for Mr. 
Warner, rather than the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Id.  
15 Sean Murphy, Charles Warner Executed: Baby Killer Says 
‘My Body Is On Fire’ During Lethal Injection In Oklahoma, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2015/01/15/charles-frederick-warner-executed_n_6483040.html. 
16 Lockett, 356 P.3d at 61 (“The appeal by the DOC and its 
interim Director has placed the issue of the secrecy provision 
of section 1015(B) undisputedly within this Court's appellate 
jurisdiction.”). 
14
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criminal courts of last resort is Texas.17 This Article 
explores the history of Texas’s and Oklahoma’s 
bifurcated courts of last resort, the similarities and 
differences between the two systems, as well as some of 
the controversies that have arisen due to jurisdictional 
questions. The Article concludes with a recommendation 
that Oklahoma and Texas each adopt a unified court of 
last resort.  
When cases arise that implicate both civil and 
criminal issues, the Oklahoma and Texas judiciaries are 
likely to suffer from “judicial hot potato,” by sending the 
cases back and forth between the criminal and civil 
divisions of the respective court.18 That is not to say, 
however, that questions of jurisdiction do not arise in 
unified systems, such as the United States federal courts. 
The key difference there lies in the vesting of a single 
court, rather than dual courts, with the final decision on 
whether a case is civil or criminal in nature. Although no 
system is perfect, by adopting a unified court of last 
resort, Texas and Oklahoma will have a single decision-
maker with a clear grant of jurisdiction to determine the 
classification of cases. 
 
                                               
17 LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 
220 (1939) (“[N]o state in the Union except Texas and 
Oklahoma has a separate court of criminal appeals.”); see also 
Ben L. Mesches, Bifurcated Appellate Review: The Texas Story 
of Two High Courts, 53 JUDGES’ J. 4 (2014). 
18 The colloquial phrase “hot potato” is defined as “a 
controversial question or issue that involves unpleasant or 
dangerous consequences for anyone dealing with it.” Hot 
Potato, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/hot%20potato. The phrase derives from the popular 
children’s party game in which participants toss to each other 
a small object resembling a potato while music is playing. See 
generally JACK MAGUIRE, HOPSCOTCH, HANGMAN, HOT POTATO 
& HA HA HA: A RULEBOOK OF CHILDREN’S GAMES (1990). When 
the music stops playing, the player holding the object is 
eliminated and cannot proceed to the next round. Id. 
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I. History 
 
 Both Texas’s and Oklahoma’s court structures 
have evolved over time, becoming the labyrinths they 
remain today. Political motivations and increased case 
volume have contributed to the byzantine network of trial 
and appellate courts that Texas maintains. In Oklahoma, 
large-scale reforms were achieved in the wake of scandal, 
but those reforms failed to address the problems inherent 
in bifurcated courts of last resort. Both states have failed 
to eliminate their bifurcated structures throughout their 
history, despite attempts to do so. 
 
A. Texas 
1. Pre-Civil War 
 
Texas became a republic in 1836,19 after declaring 
independence from Mexico.20 Texas’s first judiciary as an 
independent nation had a single supreme court composed 
of a chief justice and associate justices.21 The associate 
justices were judges of the district courts and functioned 
as the supreme court when a majority was present, which 
constituted a quorum.22 These provisions were in the 
original draft of the constitutional convention of 1836 as 
well,23 likely indicating that the judiciary was not a 
contested issue throughout the convention. 
                                               
19 REP. OF TEX. CONST. pmbl. (1836). 
20 TEX. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1836). 
21 REP. OF TEX. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1–9 (1836). 
22 Id. § 7. 
23 JOURNALS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE FREE, SOVEREIGN, AND 
INDEPENDENT PEOPLE OF TEXAS, IN GENERAL CONVENTION, 
ASSEMBLED 821–904 (H.P.N. Gammel, ed., Gammel Book Co. 
1898) (1836). 
16
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In 1845, the United States annexed Texas.24 With its 
annexation, Texas adopted a state constitution.25 The 
new constitution changed the structure of the judiciary, 
with three justices (one chief justice and two associate 
justices) sitting on the supreme court, any two of whom 
would constitute a quorum.26 The 1845 Constitution 
specifically granted habeas corpus jurisdiction to the 
Texas Supreme Court, a power it did not retain in the 
1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas.27 In addition, 
the 1845 Constitution gave district courts original 
jurisdiction in all criminal cases, which those courts did 
not retain under the 1836 Constitution.28 
In 1861, Texas seceded from the United States and 
ratified a new constitution upon joining the Confederate 
States of America.29 Notably, the 1861 Secession 
Constitution did not come with changes to the judicial 
department, however. The Constitution of 1861 kept the 
judiciary provisions in Article IV, and even maintained 
the same sections.30 Texas became a member of the 
Confederate States of America on March 23, 1861, when 
the Secession Convention adjourned for the last time.31 
 
2. Reconstruction 
 
After the Civil War, Texas began a tumultuous 
period of constitutional change in its judiciary. During 
Reconstruction, Texas was subject to federal military 
                                               
24 C.T. Neu, Annexation, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE (Sept. 23, 
2015), https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mga02. 
25 Id. 
26 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1845). 
27 Id. § 3. 
28 Id. § 10. 
29 JOURNAL OF THE SECESSION CONVENTION OF TEXAS 8 
(William Winkler, ed., 1912) (1861). 
30 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1–5, 10 (1861). 
31 Walter L. Buenger, Secession Convention, HANDBOOK OF 
TEXAS ONLINE (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.tshaonline.org/ 
handbook/online/articles/mjs01. 
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occupation and ousted all five supreme court justices on 
September 10, 1867.32 Between 1866 and 1876 Texas had 
three different constitutions.33 
 
a. Constitution of Texas (1866) 
 
 The Constitution of 1866 was written in order to 
regain admittance to the Union. Among other changes, 
the Constitution of 1866 significantly changed the 
structure of the Texas judiciary. Section 1 of Article IV 
added new constitutional courts (courts created by the 
constitution) including criminal courts, county courts, 
and corporation courts.34 The county courts had original 
jurisdiction in “all misdemeanors and petty offences, as 
the same are now, or may hereafter be defined by law; of 
such civil cases, where the matter in controversy shall 
not exceed five hundred dollars.”35 The Constitution of 
1866 also added justices of the peace, whose jurisdiction 
is further defined by law, and who had jurisdiction in civil 
matters totaling less than $100.36 
The Constitution of 1866 also added two more 
justices to the Texas Supreme Court, for a total of four 
associate justices and one chief justice.37 The appellate 
jurisdiction of the supreme court changed slightly in 
1866. Formerly, the supreme court had appellate 
jurisdiction that extended to all matters, but the 
legislature could limit appellate jurisdiction in criminal 
cases and interlocutory judgments.38 In the 1866 
                                               
32 Hans W. Baade, Chapters in the History of the Supreme Court 
of Texas: Reconstruction and “Redemption” (1866-1882), 40 ST. 
MARY'S L.J. 17, 25 (2008). 
33 TEX. CONST. art. V (1876); TEX. CONST. art. V (1869); TEX. 
CONST. art. IV (1868); TEX. CONST. art. IV (1866). 
34 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1866). 
35 Id. § 16. 
36 Id. § 19. 
37 Id. § 2. 
38 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1861). 
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Constitution, the legislature could no longer limit felony 
criminal jurisdiction from the supreme court through 
law.39 The Constitution of 1866 also provided for the 
election of district judges and expanded their jurisdiction 
beyond that of the Constitution of 1861 to include 
appellate jurisdiction from the inferior courts, original 
jurisdiction in cases dealing with slander or libel, and 
suits for the trial or title to land.40 
 
b. Constitution of 1869 
 
 Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution of 
1866, Winfield Scott Hancock, the military commander 
over Texas during Reconstruction, called for an election 
in Texas to determine whether a new constitution should 
be created.41 Texans overwhelmingly voted for a new 
constitutional convention, and the convention assembled 
on June 1, 1868.42 The convention lasted 150 days but the 
delegates did not complete a constitution.43 Nonetheless, 
what was written was submitted to the voters of the state 
and became the Constitution of 1869.44 
 The judicial department, particularly the Texas 
Supreme Court, was significantly changed in the 
Constitution of 1869. The supreme court was reduced to 
three justices45 who were subjected to nine-year term 
limits, rather than the ten-year terms under the 
Constitution of 1866.46 The district court judges retained 
appellate jurisdiction of inferior courts.47 The county 
                                               
39 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1866). 
40 Id. § 6. 
41 Claude Elliot, Constitutional Convention of 1868-69, 
HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE (June 12, 2010), 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mjc04. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 TEX. CONST. art. V, § II (1869). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. § VII. 
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courts were merged with the justice of the peace courts, 
the extent of their jurisdiction to be delineated by the 
legislature.48 
 
c. Constitution of 1876 
 
 The Constitution of 1876 is the current 
constitution of Texas, but it has been amended numerous 
times since its ratification in 1876.49 The Constitution of 
1876 differed greatly from the Constitution of 1869. It 
included, as constitutional requirements, a supreme 
court, a court of appeals, district courts, county courts, 
commissioners’ courts, courts of justices of the peace, and 
other courts that may be established by law.50 The 
Constitution of 1876 also gave the legislature the ability 
to establish specifically criminal district courts as long as 
the city had over 30,000 residents.51 The Texas Supreme 
Court remained a three-justice court,52 but, critically, its 
jurisdiction over criminal matters was eliminated. The 
supreme court had civil appellate jurisdiction only, 
reaching only the cases in which the district courts had 
original or appellate jurisdiction.53 With the absence of 
criminal jurisdiction, the supreme court also lost the 
ability to issue writs of habeas corpus. 
 The Constitution of 1876 created the Texas Court 
of Appeals, possibly in response to a congested docket.54 
Contrary to its usual nomenclature, the court of appeals 
was not an intermediate appeals court. Rather, it had 
exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal matters, as well as 
                                               
48 Id. § XX. 
49 See, e.g., TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT 
ONE, THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL 
OVERVIEW 3–5 (1990). 
50 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1876). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. § 2. 
53 Id. § 3. 
54In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 379 (Tex. 2011). 
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some civil cases arising from the county courts.55 The 
court of appeals was also elected every six years and 
consisted of three sitting judges.56 
 There are multiple theories for the bifurcation of 
civil and criminal jurisdiction between the Texas 
Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Appeals.57 Most 
hold the view that the courts’ jurisdiction was bifurcated 
due to a backlog of cases.  
Others hold the view that the Constitution of 1876 
was a “revanchist document: The fruition of a resurgence 
of state power by segregationist, mostly ex-Confederate 
Democrats after a decade under Union-run 
Reconstruction.”58 The resurgence of state power by 
segregationists allowed the Texas Democrats to change 
the constitution in order to bypass a “radical Republican” 
reconstruction court.59 This new court would allow the 
Democrats to ignore odious precedent laid down by the 
Texas Supreme Court, further reinforced by the fact that 
in the new constitution only the Texas Court of Appeals 
could hear habeas petitions during a time of martial 
law.60 The state could now avoid a reconstruction court 
when trying to enforce Jim Crow laws.61 
Either way, the bifurcated system failed to 
achieve what the drafters wanted. By 1879, the courts 
continued to fall behind in their caseloads, and the 
                                               
55 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1876). 
56 Id. § 5. 
57 See Maurice Chammah, Bill Renews Debate on Merging Top 
Two Courts, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Dec. 13, 2012, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.texastribune.org/2012/12/13/bill-merge-highest-
courts-brings-back-old-debate/; Scott Henson, Caveats to 
Debate on Merging Texas Supreme Court, Court of Criminal 
Appeals, GRITS FOR BREAKFAST (Dec. 13, 2012, 11:00 AM), 
http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2012/12/caveats-to-
debate-on-merging-texas.html. 
58 Henson, supra note 57. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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legislature created a commission of appeals.62 This too 
failed, and by 1891, the citizenry of Texas voted to 
entirely supplant the judicial article of the Constitution 
of 1876.63 
 
3. Amendments to 1876 Constitution 
a. 1891 Amendment 
 
 In 1891, the state of Texas adopted a wholesale 
replacement of its judiciary through an amendment.64 
The 1891 amendment removed the Texas Court of 
Appeals and replaced it with the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.65 Thus, the 
new system added a mid-level appeals court and gave the 
Texas Supreme Court the responsibility of resolving 
conflicts between the courts of civil appeals.66 
 The Texas Supreme Court maintained its limit of 
three sitting justices, as did the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals.67 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals was also 
composed of three judges per court.68 After adopting the 
1891 amendment, the Texas legislature added two more 
                                               
62 James T. Worthen, The Organizational & Structural 
Development of Intermediate Appellate Courts in Texas, 1892–
2003, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 33, 34 (2004). 
63 Id. at 35. 
64 See generally S.J. Res. 16, 22d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1891). 
65 Id. § 1. 
66 Id. Additionally, it is important to note that the 1891 
amendment gave the Texas Supreme Court the ability to issue 
writs of habeas corpus, which had not been present in the 
Constitution of 1876. S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 3 (Tex. 
1891); see also Tex. Const. art. V § 3 (1876). The 1891 
amendment also explicitly eliminated the use of the writ of 
mandamus by the Texas Supreme Court against the Governor. 
S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 3 (Tex. 1891). 
67 S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. at §§ 2, 4 (Tex. 1891). 
68 Id. § 6. 
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courts of appeal.69 The term limits remained six years for 
each justice and judge, with each elected by popular 
vote.70 No additional courts were changed by the 1891 
amendment.71 
 The next set of constitutional amendments 
affecting the judiciary did not occur until 1954.72 That 
does not mean, however, that there were no legislative 
changes to the judiciary. Between 1893 and 1967, Texas 
added eleven new appellate districts.73 The further 
constitutional changes were concerned, primarily, with 
the supreme court and the court of criminal appeals. 
Before addressing these changes, I will briefly describe 
what has occurred at the trial court level since 1876. 
 
b. Trial Courts in Texas 
 
 Texas has a dizzying array of trial courts. 
Constitutional trial courts include district, county, and 
justice of the peace courts. There are currently 507 
district courts across the state.74 Unfortunately, the 
legislature, in an effort to deal with changing caseloads, 
has created statutory district courts that have specific 
jurisdictional preferences.75 Thus, a litigant will have to 
determine the correct district court in which to bring her 
                                               
69 W.O. Murray, Our Courts of Civil Appeals, 25 TEX. B.J. 269, 
270 (1962). 
70 S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. at §§ 2, 4, 6 (Tex. 1891). 
71 There still remained district courts, county courts, 
commissioner’s courts, and courts of justices of the peace. S.J. 
Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Tex. 1891). 
72 TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXAS 
CONSTITUTION SINCE 1876 65–70 (Feb. 2016). 
73 See Worthen, supra note 62 at 36. 
74 State District Courts, TEXAS STATE DIRECTORY, 
https://www.txdirectory.com/online/dist/ (last visited on Dec. 2, 
2016). 
75 TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT ONE, THE 
TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW 30 
(1990). 
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claim, even though she may live within the geographical 
confines of multiple district courts. Litigation in Texas is 
further confused by the existence of the county courts, 
which consist of statutory county courts and 
constitutional county courts.76 Statutory county courts 
actually have no common thread: They are simply a 
patchwork creation of local judicial needs.77 There is no 
commonality among them. Constitutional county courts 
are required in each county, where the judge is the chief 
executive officer of the county. A county court judge is not 
constitutionally required to be an attorney, and she has 
limited jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases.78 
 Finally, there are the justice of the peace courts. 
These courts have varying jurisdiction by statute and 
primarily operate as small claims courts and cases 
involving traffic fines.79 Only about eight percent of the 
justices of the peace are lawyers,80 yet justice of the peace 
courts are responsible for a significant portion of state 
revenue.81 
 There are many other forms of trial courts in 
Texas, but the subject is beyond the scope of this Article.82 
It is enough to know that the Texas judicial system 
includes a confusing mass of overlapping jurisdictions 
and courts, oftentimes run by non-lawyers. The existence 
of this patchwork only adds to the confusion of litigants. 
As will be discussed later, litigants struggle already in 
                                               
76 Id. at 41, 45. 
77 Id. at 41–43. 
78 Id. at 48. 
79 Id. at 49. 
80 In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 383 (Tex. 2011). 
81 TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT ONE, THE 
TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW 49 
(1990). 
82 For more information on Texas’s judicial system, see 
Guittard, infra, note 84; 2010 Annual Report for the Texas 
Judiciary, OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/454879/2010-Annual-
Report2_25_11.pdf. 
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the quest for the proper trial court. Bifurcated courts of 
last resort only add to the confusion and headache faced 
by litigants, especially when they do not know which 
appeals court has jurisdiction in their case. 
 
c. Amendments Since 1891 Regarding the 
Structure and Function of the Appellate 
Courts in Texas. 
 
 In 1945 Texas increased the size of its supreme 
court from three to nine justices.83 In 1966, Texas 
increased the criminal court of appeals from three to five 
members.84 Then, in 1977 the criminal court of appeals 
increased to nine sitting judges.85 The court of appeals 
has also changed significantly since 1891, including the 
addition of criminal jurisdiction. 
In 1978, Texas adopted a constitutional 
amendment allowing for more than three members on 
the court of civil appeals.86 In 1980, the criminal backlog 
was so great that the average disposition of a criminal 
appeal was three years.87 The resulting constitutional 
amendment gave the court of appeals appellate 
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal appeals, except 
death penalty cases.88 This system is how the Texas 
appellate courts operate today. There are fourteen 
appellate districts, with varying numbers of judges on 
each court. This appellate court has both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction, with the sole exception of death 
penalty cases. The Texas Supreme Court and Texas 
                                               
83 S.J. Res. 8, 49th Reg. Sess. TEX. CONST. amend. art. V, § 2 
(Tex. 1945). 
84 Clarence Guittard, The Expanded Texas Courts of Appeals, 
14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 549, 551 (1983). 
85 Id. at 552. 
86 Worthen, supra note 62 at 38. 
87 Guittard, supra note 84, at 552. 
88 S.J. Res. 36, 66th Reg. Sess. TEX. CONST. amend. art. V, §§ 5, 
6 (Tex. 1979).  
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Court of Criminal Appeals each have nine justices and 
exercise only civil or only criminal jurisdiction, 
respectively. The stopgap legislation and patchwork 
courts in Texas used to alleviate backlogs of cases has led 
to the jurisdictional issues which will be taken up in Part 
II, infra. 
 
B. Oklahoma 
1. 1907 Constitution 
 
The original judiciary article of the Oklahoma 
Constitution, ratified in 1907, provided specifically for a 
supreme court, district courts, county courts, courts of 
justices of the peace, municipal courts, and allowed for 
the creation of a criminal court of appeals.89 The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court maintained criminal 
jurisdiction as long as there was not a statutorily created 
criminal court of appeals.90 The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court was composed of five justices, divided into five 
judicial districts, nominated by political parties, and 
voted for by the state in an at-large election.91 The term 
of office was six years.92 
District courts were courts of general jurisdiction, 
and divided into twenty-one districts.93 County courts 
were specifically for probate, matters in controversy less 
than $1,000, and misdemeanors.94 County courts were 
also courts of appeals for justice of the peace courts.95 
Justice of the peace courts had concurrent jurisdiction 
with county courts, but for less money, and lesser 
offenses.96 
                                               
89 OKLA. CONST. art. VII § 1 (1907). 
90 Id. § 2. 
91 Id. § 3. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. §§ 9, 10. 
94 Id. §§ 12, 13. 
95 Id. § 14. 
96 Id. § 18. 
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The first criminal court of appeals was created in 
the 1907–1908 session of the Oklahoma legislature, 
which was the first legislative session of Oklahoma.97 
This act gave the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals 
exclusive criminal appellate jurisdiction, with the 
exception that the Oklahoma Supreme Court was to 
make determinations of constitutionality, should they 
arise.98 The 1909 legislature perpetuated the criminal 
court of appeals, repealed all prior acts in conflict, and 
gave it exclusive appellate jurisdiction of criminal 
matters.99 The 1909 act created three judicial districts, 
and provided for general elections of the judges.100 In 
1959, the legislature changed the name of the Oklahoma 
Criminal Court of Appeals to the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals.101  
 
2. 1967 Amendment to the 1907 Constitution 
 
There were other changes along the way, but in 
1967, in response to serious criticism and cries for reform, 
Oklahoma adopted a new judicial system.102 According to 
Dean Earl Sneed of the University of Oklahoma Law 
School, the judicial system of Oklahoma by the 1960s 
was, “ancient, creaky, inefficient, outmoded, complex, 
costly, and antiquated.”103 He further stated that the 
system “was not good in 1907, and has grown 
progressively worse in the fifty-eight years since 
statehood[.]”104 While Oklahoma’s appeals courts 
                                               
97 History of the Court, OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS (2014), http://www.okcca.net/History.html. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See, e.g., Earl Sneed, Unfinished Business or All the Way in 
One Play, 19 OKLA. L. REV. 5, 6 (1966) (expounding his 
dissatisfaction with the system of justice in Oklahoma). 
103 Sneed, supra note 102, at 7. 
104 Id. 
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remained largely unchanged since 1907, its lower courts 
were a mess by the 1960s. Dean Sneed provided an 
anecdote that illustrates the frustrating complexity of the 
lower court system. 
 
Fred [a research assistant to Dean Sneed] 
produced seven pages of legal size, single 
spaced material with just the most basic 
facts about our court system. It would have 
been longer, but I told Fred that because of 
the virtual impossibility of the task, he 
should omit any detail about police and 
municipal courts and courts of specialized 
jurisdiction such as the juvenile court in 
Tulsa County, and that he should just 
mention the superior and common pleas 
courts which exist only in a few counties in 
Oklahoma. And of course, since Fred did 
that work in 1954, we have created small 
claims courts, the children's court in 
Oklahoma County, the aforementioned 
special session courts, and city courts. I 
have added three more pages to Fred's 
work.105 
 
At the appellate level, Dean Sneed’s derision of the 
Oklahoma court system focused on judicial appointment 
and selection, judicial salaries, and centralized 
rulemaking power.106 
 One central impetus for the revision of the 
Oklahoma judiciary was the scandal of the 1960s. It came 
to be known that from the 1930s until the 1950s, Justice 
N.S. Corn, along with possibly four other justices, took 
bribes in exchange for dispositions in supreme court 
                                               
105 Id. at 10. 
106 Phillip Simpson, The Modernization and Reform of the 
Oklahoma Judiciary, 3 OKLA. POL. 1, 6 (1994). 
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cases.107 The scandal came to a head in 1956, with a 
$150,000 bribe in the Selected Investment case.108 In July 
of 1964, Justice Corn was sentenced to eighteen months 
in prison.109 Justice Welch was also sentenced to prison, 
and Justice Johnson was impeached.110 In 1966, 
Oklahoma adopted a court on the judiciary.111 
 The battle for reform was hardly over. Once it was 
clear that reform was necessary, Dean Sneed and the 
legislature went to work.112 Dean Sneed would have to go 
to the voters with an initiative petition in order to bypass 
the legislature.113 During this time, anti-reformers were 
ousted in the election of 1966.114 The Sneed plan was 
submitted to the voters, but the legislature had already 
devised its own reform plan.115 The voters rejected 
Sneed’s plan, but reform was ultimately achieved 
through the legislature.116 
 In July 1967, the constitutional provisions that 
repealed and replaced the 1907 Article VII of the 
Oklahoma Constitution were approved.117 “The two most 
significant changes . . .  [to Article VII were the creation 
of] one state trial court of general jurisdiction[,] and . . . 
[the creation of a judicial system] under the supervision 
and control of the [S]upreme Court.”118 The Article 
                                               
107 Id.  
108 Id. See generally Selected Invs. Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 
309 P.2d 267 (1957).  
109 Simpson, supra note 106, at 7. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 8. 
112 Id. at 8–9. 
113 Id. at 9. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 9–12. 
116 Id. at 12. 
117 George B. Fraser, Oklahoma’s New Judicial System, 21 
OKLA. L. REV. 373 (1968). 
118 Id. Note that although the Oklahoma Supreme Court is the 
highest court, it still does not maintain jurisdiction in criminal 
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further provides that justices of the supreme court and 
court of criminal appeals shall be nominated by a 
commission and appointed by the governor,119 and that 
other judges are selected through a non-partisan 
election.120 The constitution kept the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
was to have the final say regarding jurisdiction if a 
disagreement between the supreme court and the court 
of criminal appeals arose.121 
 
3. Current Operation 
 
Oklahoma’s judiciary currently includes four 
courts of limited jurisdiction, one trial court of general 
jurisdiction, one civil appeals court, and the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court and Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals as courts of last resort.122 
The four courts of limited jurisdiction are 
statutory courts.123 They include the Workers’ 
Compensation Court of Existing Claims, the Court of Tax 
Review, the Municipal Courts not of Record, and the 
Municipal Courts of Record.124 The workers’ 
compensation court and Court of Tax Review are 
appealable directly to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The 
Municipal Court not of Record is appealed to the district 
court.125 The Municipal Court of Record is appealable 
                                               
matters. Criminal appeals still only go to the Oklahoma Court 
of Criminal Appeals. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
119 OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 4.  
120 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9. 
121 Id. § 4. Unfortunately, as will be discussed infra, the court 
of criminal appeals does not always follow the jurisdictional 
mandates of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 
122 The Oklahoma Judicial Center, Supreme Court Brochure 
(2016), http://www.oscn.net/oscn/schome/fullbrochure.htm.   
123 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.  
124 The Oklahoma Judicial Center, supra note 122. 
125 Id. 
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directly to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.126 
District court decisions can be appealed to both the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals, depending on whether the matter is 
civil or criminal.127 
The civil appellate court in Oklahoma operates 
differently than most judicial systems. The constitutional 
amendment of 1967 allowed for the adoption of an 
intermediate appellate court, and the resulting statute 
requires the appeal to go to the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, which then may assign appeals to the 
intermediate courts unless otherwise provided by 
statute.128 In other words, all appeals go to the supreme 
court, which then decides which cases it gives to the court 
of civil appeals. All decisions by the court of civil appeals 
are final unless the Oklahoma Supreme Court grants 
certiorari.129 The court of civil appeals currently has four 
divisions, each with three judges. Two divisions are in 
Tulsa County and the other two are in Oklahoma 
County.130 
The courts of last resort in Oklahoma are set up 
differently than they are in Texas because Oklahoma 
places ultimate power to decide jurisdictional conflicts in 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court.131 The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court is composed of nine members coming 
                                               
126 Id. 
127 Id.; see also OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.  
128 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.  
129 Id. The statutes governing the Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals can be found in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 30.1 (West 
2017). 
130 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 30.2 (West 2017). This law 
became effective in 1982. 5 OKLA. PRAC., APPELLATE PRAC. § 
1:26 (2016 ed.). 
131 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. Texas courts of last resort are 
coequal, which can result in instances where jurisdiction is 
contested and there is no resolution. See discussion infra Part 
II.A. 
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from nine different districts.132 The Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals maintains exclusive jurisdiction in 
criminal appeals,133 and is composed now of five 
members.134  
 
II. Current Issues in Jurisdiction 
 
 Both Texas and Oklahoma suffer from “judicial 
hot potato,” where the courts of last resort either fight 
over jurisdiction to hear a case, or pass a case back and 
forth until the case is either dismissed or forced upon one 
of the courts. This usually results from hard cases that 
have both civil and criminal aspects. Below, I will provide 
examples of different cases that resulted in “judicial hot 
potato” in each of the states’ courts of last resort, and 
compare issues, where relevant, to the federal system. 
 
A. Texas 
 
 This section will explore a few examples that 
demonstrate the issues caused by Texas’s bifurcated 
court structure. These cases involve contempt,135 a civil 
exercise of a stay of execution,136 appeals from property 
forfeiture orders in criminal prosecution,137 and the 
exercise of equity jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of 
arguably unconstitutional penal laws.138 In the analysis 
section, I will tie together the when and why of these 
jurisdictional tangles. 
                                               
132 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1- 2 (West 2017). 
133 Id. § 40 (West 2017). 
134 Id. (West 2017). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is 
composed of nine members. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.112 
(West 2017). 
135 In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011). 
136 Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 88 
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 
137 Bretz v. State, 508 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
138 Texas v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994). 
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The primary drawback in a bifurcated court of last 
resort system is determining which courts get which 
cases when there are both civil and criminal aspects. In 
Texas, an illustrative example of this situation occurred 
in In Re Reece.139 In Reece, the Texas Supreme Court 
grappled with the question of whether a litigant can be 
held in contempt for perjury committed during a 
deposition.140 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
refused to grant habeas review because the case that 
gave rise to the contempt order was civil.141 The Texas 
Supreme Court held that it could exercise mandamus 
jurisdiction because the relator did not have an adequate 
remedy by appeal, precisely because there was not a 
criminal appeals court that would hear his habeas 
petition.142 
 The Texas Supreme Court can only exercise 
habeas jurisdiction when “the contemnor’s confinement 
is on account of a violation of an order, judgment, or 
decree previously made in a civil case.”143 The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals, on the other hand, maintains 
general habeas jurisdiction.144 The law giving the Texas 
Supreme Court habeas jurisdiction was designed to keep 
civil trials on the civil side of the bifurcated courts.145 
Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to 
hear the relator’s habeas petition, and the Texas 
Supreme Court did not have habeas jurisdiction because 
there was not a violation of a specific court order, the 
relator claimed he was without adequate remedy by 
appeal.146 
                                               
139 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011). 
140 Id. at 362. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 369 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(e)). 
144 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5. 
145 See Tex. S.B. 36, 29th Leg., R.S. (1905). 
146 Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 369. 
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 The Texas Supreme Court, through statutory 
construction and reliance on prior case law, determined 
that mandamus jurisdiction was broad enough to cover 
instances in which an individual was wrongly held in 
contempt.147 Because the statute in question grants 
broad mandamus jurisdiction, and because there was no 
prohibition on the use of mandamus to free someone from 
confinement, the court reasoned that mandamus 
jurisdiction was permissible.148 Ultimately, because the 
Texas Supreme Court found that the underlying case 
here was civil and there was no habeas jurisdiction, there 
was no adequate remedy by appeal, and thus mandamus 
jurisdiction could be used.149 
 Justice Willett’s dissent is the most informative 
aspect of this case for this Article’s purposes, because he 
outlines many of the flaws in Texas’s bifurcated court 
system.150 Justice Willett noted the court of criminal 
appeals’ “lateral[ed]” to the Texas Supreme Court 
because they mistakenly believed that the supreme court 
had habeas jurisdiction in this case.151 The supreme court 
agreed, 9-0, that there was not habeas jurisdiction.152 The 
                                               
147 Id. at 373–75. 
148 Id; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a). 
149 Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 376. 
150 See id. at 378–402 (Willett, J., dissenting). Justice Willett 
begins his jurisdictional diatribe with statements such as, 
“Unfortunately, the juris-imprudent design of the Texas 
judiciary does not make the list. Today's case is a byproduct of 
that recondite web, sparking a game of jurisdictional hot potato 
between us and our constitutional twin, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals.” Id. at 378. 
151 Id. at 378 n.1. (“Although this Court does have the authority 
to act in this case pursuant to Article 5, § 5, of the Texas 
Constitution, we decline to do so. Effective 1981, Article 5, § 
3(a) of the Texas Constitution was amended to give the Texas 
Supreme Court and the Justices thereof the authority to issue 
writs of habeas corpus.”) (quoting In re Reece, No. WR–72,199–
02, slip op. at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. June 29, 2009)). 
152 See id. at 378. 
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point Justice Willett made was that even the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals, the state court of last resort for 
criminal cases, made a mistake navigating the judicial 
labyrinth that Texas created. 
 Justice Willett also pointed out how difficult this 
jurisdictional issue was (and continues to be) for 
litigants. There is a stock letter informing litigants that 
the Texas Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in a 
particular area, directing them to re-file in the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals.153 Justice Willett described 
other instances, discussed infra, in which there have 
been jurisdictional quandaries between the two courts of 
last resort.154  
When Justice Willett arrived at the heart of the 
immediate case, he argued that the Texas Supreme Court 
did not have jurisdiction to grant mandamus.155 Both he 
and the majority recognized that the supreme court is 
prohibited by statute from using habeas jurisdiction.156 
Nevertheless, Justice Willett contended that using 
mandamus jurisdiction as a patch to do exactly what 
habeas jurisdiction entails is prohibited by statute.157 
Justice Willett countered the majority’s argument that 
mandamus existed because there was no adequate 
remedy at law by pointing out that there was an adequate 
remedy by appeal through a motion for rehearing in the 
court of criminal appeals.158 Justice Willett then pointed 
out the perils of deciding this case via mandamus 
jurisdiction: If the court granted mandamus here, when 
                                               
153 Id. at 380. 
154 Id. at 384 (including a notable case dealing with anti-
sodomy laws in 1992). 
155 Id. at 391. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. (“Where the Legislature has spoken clearly and removed 
the kind of case now before us from our jurisdiction, it is 
disingenuous to circumvent the rule by renaming the 
remedy.”). 
158 Id. at 399. 
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the court of criminal appeals also has habeas jurisdiction, 
litigants will be unsure of the proper court in which to 
file.159 Finally, Justice Willett pointed to the issue of a 
civil court hearing cases in which the appeal arises from 
a criminal penalty.160 The Texas Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the bifurcation issue between civil 
and criminal cases is determined by the nature of the 
court’s punishment.161 Justice Willett concluded his 
dissent with some judicial “shade-throwing,”162 by 
stating, “At the very least (and it grieves me to use these 
six words) Texas should be more like Oklahoma” by 
vesting one court with final determination of 
jurisdictional questions.163 
It is important to note that the distinction 
between civil and criminal contempt in federal court can 
also be a difficult line to draw. My argument throughout 
is that a bifurcated system takes a difficult question and 
                                               
159 Id. (“Similarly, this case leaves open the question of whether 
and when a petitioner may seek review in both courts, and in 
what order. Such confusion could lead to an unnecessarily 
increased docket in either court, or at least wasted resources 
spent shuffling cases between the two systems (or discussing 
whether to do the shuffle in the first place).”). 
160 Id. at 401 (“Further, hearing this case, and perhaps future 
cases like it, may force us to handle appeals from civil cases 
with criminal penalties, and force us at least in part to take on 
quasi-criminal matters.”). 
161 Id. at 371. 
162 See Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (Apr. 16, 
2015, 7:10 PM), https://twitter.com/justicewillett/ 
status/588887181554417664 (using “throw shade” colloquially). 
See generally Linette Lopez, This is Where the Expression 
‘Throw Shade’ Comes From, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/where-the-expression-throw-
shade-comes-from-2015-3 (describing what it means to throw 
shade).  
163 Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 at 402 (describing his desire for a 
court that has clear authority to determine jurisdiction, similar 
to what Oklahoma’s judicial system contains). 
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makes it harder. The decision as to whether an appeal 
from a contempt order is civil or criminal “drives the 
process that is required, including the type of notice, the 
standard of proof, the relevance of the validity of the 
underlying order, and the level of intent.”164 As Judge 
Hartz has noted, the way federal courts determine civil 
and criminal appeals hinges upon “the essential nature 
of the action, not the underlying proceeding it arose from 
. . . .”165 For contempt, this means the distinction is 
whether the judgment is ordered to achieve compliance 
with an order or to punish.166  
Texas’s habeas statute attempts to meet this 
distinction by only granting habeas powers to the Texas 
Supreme Court if the confinement is in violation of a 
court order. An individual was found in contempt of court 
for lying during a deposition, not as a result of a court 
order or decree previously made. It is clear that the 
purpose of the contempt order in this case was to punish. 
The real problem in this case was that the underlying 
civil case resulted in what appears to be a criminal 
contempt judgment. Thus, the purpose was criminal, but 
the underlying proceeding was civil. While the federal 
system may have difficulty distinguishing between 
criminal and civil contempt at times, at least the courts 
and litigants know which judge or court will decide the 
issue. In Texas, the status of the underlying action is 
added to the mix, which means that Judge Hartz’s 
observation will not provide redress to Texas state court 
litigators. One must take into account both the purpose 
of the order and the underlying action. And, the litigator, 
without the supreme court’s creation of the mandamus 
                                               
164 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3950.8 (4th ed. 2016). 
165 In re Special Grand Jury 89–2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1167 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 526 
(4th Cir. 2000)). 
166 See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369–70 
(1966). 
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loophole, would actually be without a court to appeal a 
criminal contempt order arising out of civil trial. 
In Holmes, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
held that they could exercise mandamus jurisdiction to 
prevent an appeals court from exercising civil jurisdiction 
over a stay of execution pending a hearing on clemency.167 
The case concerned inmate Gary Graham, who was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. This 
particular case was an attempt by Graham to force the 
Board of Pardon and Paroles to hear Graham’s request 
for clemency through an injunction. The district court 
entered an order to either provide a hearing or enjoin the 
execution until the hearing occurred.168 The Board 
appealed, and the court of appeals entered an injunction 
preventing the execution.169 The relators (the district 
attorney and the Board of Pardons and Pleas) appealed 
up to the court of criminal appeals seeking a writ of 
mandamus.170 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
found that the stay of execution was a criminal law 
matter because capital punishment only arises from 
capital murder convictions.171  
Judge Meyers noted in dissent that the 
controversy surrounding this case arose from the 
bifurcated nature of Texas courts of last resort,172 
identifying the language in the Texas Constitution that 
gave rise to the confusion in this case.173 If “criminal law 
                                               
167 Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 885 
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 
168 Id. at 391. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 394. 
172 Id. at 418 (Meyers, J., dissenting). 
173 Id. (“Our Constitution provides that the Supreme Court’s 
‘appellate jurisdiction shall be final and shall extend to all 
cases except in criminal law matters,’” while “[t]his Court, on 
the other hand, has ‘final appellate jurisdiction . . . in all 
criminal cases of whatever grade . . . .’” (quoting TEX. CONST. 
art. V, §§ 3, 5)). 
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matters” and “criminal cases,” as used in the state 
constitution, mean the same thing, then the court of 
criminal appeals would have exclusive jurisdiction.174 
But if they mean something different, then it is possible 
that there is overlapping jurisdiction with civil courts.175 
Judge Meyers suspected that the majority of the court 
refused to allow this case to go through a normal appeal 
process for fear of it being appealed to the Texas Supreme 
Court instead of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 
and thus stepped in to prevent that possibility.176 Judge 
Meyers ended his dissent with a scathing statement 
regarding the jurisdictional warfare that he accused the 
majority of waging: 
 
Our entire manner has had the 
appearance of a guerilla raid, when it 
should instead have been a cooperative 
effort to construe fundamental aspects of 
Texas constitutional law. In the process, 
we have violated basic principles of our 
own mandamus jurisprudence, encouraged 
the misuse of habeas corpus, and 
shamelessly interrupted an appellate 
process which was running exactly as 
prescribed by law, and which might very 
well have produced results better than 
expected by the majority had it been 
permitted to proceed to final judgment.177 
 
 Bretz v. State, which involved an individual 
acquitted of receiving and concealing stolen property and 
                                               
174 Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 885 
S.W.2d 389, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (Meyers, J., 
dissenting). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 418–19. (stating that Judge Meyers himself is not 
willing to “fight a turf war with other Texas courts”). 
177 Id. at 421. 
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ordered to return the property to the complaining 
witness, provides a much simpler example.178 The 
defendant in the case appealed the order to the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals,179 but the court held that it 
did not have jurisdiction.180 Judge Roberts concurred and 
took time to expound the issues presented with 
bifurcated appeals.181 Judge Roberts lamented that even 
though this appeal came from a judgment in a criminal 
trial governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure in 
Texas, the court had to send Bretz “on his way to begin 
yet another search for the proper forum,”182 which, in this 
case, was the Texas Supreme Court. 
 In addition to forfeiture, Judge Roberts brought to 
light a few other instances of the confusion litigants face 
in Texas’s bifurcated court system.183 For example, bond 
forfeiture proceedings are reviewed by the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals, yet are governed by the rules of civil 
procedure.184 When a defendant seeks a writ of 
mandamus to enforce his right to a speedy trial, the 
defendant must file his petition for the writ in the Texas 
Supreme Court, not the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 
where presumably the defendant later will be able to 
appeal a conviction and argue that he was denied the 
right to a speedy trial.185 
 The federal courts face similar issues. Bond 
forfeiture proceedings are civil;186 property forfeiture 
                                               
178 Bretz v. State, 508 S.W.2d 97, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 98 (“Further, I feel that this case presents an excellent 
example of a problem often encountered in this State.”). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 98–99. 
184 Id. 
185 Id.; see also Fariss v. Tipps, 463 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1971) 
(judgment set aside on other grounds). 
186 United States v. Plechner, 577 F.2d 596, 597 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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proceedings are criminal.187 But in Texas, the outcomes 
can be absurd. A court that has jurisdiction solely in 
criminal matters must use the rules of civil procedure. 
That scenario cannot exist in a unified system.  
 One high profile case in Texas highlighting the 
problems inherent in a bifurcated court structure came 
in 1994 with a challenge to Texas’s anti-sodomy law.188 In 
State v. Morales, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the 
Texas anti-sodomy law, a criminal statute, could be 
declared unconstitutional by the Texas Supreme Court 
only if it resulted in an irreparable injury to a property 
right.189 The majority held that the court should avoid 
construing rights concerning a penal statute and further 
expressed pragmatic concerns with conflicting opinions 
between the two courts of last resort, noting that the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also refused to exercise 
its jurisdiction in this Texas constitutional challenge.190 
It is not clear why the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
declined to hear this case, although one could postulate 
that because there was no criminal prosecution, the court 
saw no need to take jurisdiction. As a result, the lower 
court’s decision declaring the law unconstitutional was 
reversed, and the matter was remanded to the trial court 
to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.191 Thus, both 
of Texas’s courts of last resort decided that they lacked 
jurisdiction in this case. What is the point of having two 
courts of last resort if neither of them can take a 
particular case?  
Another question arises from the Morales cases: 
How might one case end up in front of both courts of last 
resort? The Attorney General appealed to both courts at 
the same time. The Attorney General was quoted as 
                                               
187 United States v. De Los Santos, 260 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
188 State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994). 
189 Id. at 942. 
190 Id. at 948 n.16. 
191 Id. at 949. 
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saying, “We want to make sure we're not locked out of an 
appeal. It was either file with both or roll the dice.”192 
Even the Attorney General’s office, the law firm of Texas, 
was unsure how to navigate the bifurcated court 
structure. 
 
B. Oklahoma 
 
 Oklahoma’s judiciary, although not loved by all 
members of the Oklahoma bar, seems to enjoy fewer 
jurisdictional quandaries than Texas as a result of the 
1967 large-scale judicial reforms. However, issues still 
remain with Oklahoma’s bifurcated system of courts, 
including the exercise of civil jurisdiction to enjoin an 
execution, juvenile delinquency, and contempt.193 
 The procedural paths of Clayton Lockett and 
Charles Warner’s cases through the Oklahoma judiciary 
form a most tangled web. Warner was convicted at trial 
of first-degree murder and first-degree rape.194 The trial 
court’s conviction was reversed, and the case was 
remanded for a new trial.195 Warner’s second trial also 
resulted in conviction for first-degree murder and first-
degree rape.196 This time, on appeal, Warner’s conviction 
was upheld.197 After losing in the Oklahoma Court of 
                                               
192 In re Coy Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 385 n.68 (Tex. 2011) 
(quoting Janet Elliott, State Appeals Twice in Sodomy Case, 
But Neither High Court May Want ‘Hot Potato’, TEX. 
LAWYER, May 18, 1992, at 1). 
193 See, e.g., Carder v. Court of Crim. App., 595 P.2d 416 (Okla. 
1978) (deciding a jurisdictional issue against the determination 
made by the court of criminal appeals); Ronald N. Ricketts, 
Indirect Contempt in Oklahoma, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 213 (1974) 
(discussing the thorny issue of the quasi-criminal nature of 
contempt in a bifurcated appeal system). 
194 See generally Warner v. State, 29 P.3d 569 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2001). 
195 Id. at 575.  
196 Warner v. State, 144 P.3d 838, 896 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).  
197 Id. 
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Criminal Appeals, Warner appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which denied certiorari.198 Warner then filed a 
writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma.199 The writ was denied, 
and Warner appealed to the Tenth Circuit, where the 
district court’s decision was affirmed.200 Warner then 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the writ of 
certiorari once again was denied.201 
Clayton Derrell Lockett was charged with 
conspiracy, first-degree burglary, assault with a 
dangerous weapon, forcible oral sodomy, first-degree 
rape, kidnapping, robbery by force and fear, and first-
degree murder.202 Lockett was convicted on all nine 
counts and sentenced to death.203 The Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court below.204 
Lockett then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, where 
the petition for a writ of certiorari was denied.205 Lockett 
then filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, where the 
writ was denied and judgment was entered against 
Lockett.206 Lockett appealed to the Tenth Circuit where 
the judgment was affirmed.207 Certiorari was denied by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.208 
 Lockett and Warner then joined as plaintiffs and 
filed a petition for declaratory relief and requested an 
injunction against the Oklahoma Department of 
                                               
198 Warner v. Oklahoma, 550 U.S. 942 (2007). 
199 Warner v. Workman, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (W.D. Okla. 
2011). 
200 Warner v. Trammell, 520 Fed. Appx. 675 (10th Cir. 2013). 
201 Warner v. Trammell, 134 S. Ct. 924 (2014). 
202 Lockett v. State, 53 P.3d 418, 421 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 431. 
205 Lockett v. Oklahoma, 538 U.S. 982 (2003). 
206 Lockett v. Workman, No. CIV-03-734-F, 2011 WL 10843368 
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 2011). 
207 Lockett v. Trammel, 711 F.3d 1218, 1255 (10th Cir. 2013). 
208 Lockett v. Trammel, 134 S. Ct. 924 (2014). 
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Corrections on a challenge to the constitutionality of an 
Oklahoma statute209 that concealed the identity of the 
drugs to be used in their executions.210 The Oklahoma 
Attorney General’s Office removed the case to the United 
States District Court, due to Lockett and Warner’s 
invocation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.211 Lockett and Warner then amended their 
complaint to remove federal issues, and the case was 
remanded back to the Oklahoma district court.212 The 
Oklahoma district court then found that jurisdiction for 
issuing a temporary injunction lays solely in the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.213 Plaintiffs 
appealed the trial court’s order finding jurisdiction lays 
solely in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court.214 The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court remanded the declaratory judgment matter to the 
trial court for resolution of civil matters, and transferred 
the emergency stay of execution motion to the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals.215 During this time, however, 
the state of Oklahoma was unable to procure execution 
drugs, and thus a thirty-day stay was entered and the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the 
emergency stay motion as moot.216 
 The district court then ruled on the declaratory 
judgment and found the confidentiality law 
unconstitutional under the Oklahoma Constitution as a 
                                               
209 See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 1015(B) (2011) (“The 
identity of all persons who participate in or administer the 
execution process and persons who supply the drugs, medical 
supplies or medical equipment for the execution shall be 
confidential and shall not be subject to discovery in any civil or 
criminal proceedings.”). 
210 Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d 58, 58 (Okla. 2014). 
211 Id. at 59. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 60. 
44
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol12/iss2/1
JUDICIAL HOT POTATO 
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 161 (2018) 
 
 
[195] 
denial of the plaintiffs’ right to access the courts.217 The 
plaintiffs then sought a stay of execution pending the 
appeal of the district court’s declaratory judgment.218 The 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, however, denied 
the stay of execution, holding that it may only issue a stay 
of execution pending a challenge to conviction or sentence 
of death.219 The plaintiffs again appealed to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, which exercised jurisdiction 
in deciding the constitutional question220 but ruled that 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals maintained 
jurisdiction to issue a stay of execution.221 Thus, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court—per its constitutional 
authority—instructed the court of criminal appeals to 
take jurisdiction.222 Unfortunately, this was not the end 
of the judicial hot potato. 
 Upon receiving the case from the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court for a second time, and after a clear 
pronouncement of jurisdiction from that court, the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals refused to exercise 
its jurisdiction and held: 
 
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court has 
authority to deem an issue civil and so 
                                               
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Lockett v. State, 329 P.3d 755, 759 (Okla. Crim. App. 2014). 
Note the similarity to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal’s 
denial of review in Reece. Because the appeal arose out of a civil 
matter, the Reece court denied relief. 
220 Lockett v. Evans, 377 P.3d 1254, 1254 (Okla. 2014). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 1254–55 (“In exercising our constitutional power to 
determine jurisdiction, we transfer ‘only’ the Application for 
Emergency Stay to the Court of Criminal Appeals. In so doing, 
we urge the appellate criminal court to be cognizant of the time 
restraints associated with the submission of the appeal(s) to 
this Court along with the gravity of the first impression 
constitutional issues this Court will be charged with in 
addressing the civil appeal, or appeals.”). 
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within its jurisdiction, it does not have the 
power to supersede a statute and 
manufacture jurisdiction in this Court for 
Appellants’ stay request by merely 
transferring it here. Therefore, Appellants’ 
application for stays of execution is 
DENIED.223 
 
In response to the court of criminal appeals’ refusal to 
exercise its jurisdiction, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
wrote: 
 
On April, 17, 2014, Thursday 
last, we exercised our constitutional 
authority to determine the appropriate 
tribunal for resolution of the stay issue 
under the Oklahoma Constitution, Article 
7, section 4, vesting this Court with the 
sole power to determine whether the 
jurisdiction of the stay issue was within 
this Court or the Court of Criminal 
Appeals. In so doing, we transferred the 
request for stay “alone” to the Court of 
Criminal Appeals. 
The majority of the Court of 
Criminal Appeals refused to exercise this 
Court's order and to address the merits of 
the stay. That order, which we consider to 
be invalid as not having followed the 
constitutional directive of this Court, have 
[sic] now resulted in a situation never 
contemplated by the drafters of 
Oklahoma's ultimate rule of law—that this 
tribunal be inserted into death penalty 
                                               
223 Lockett, 329 P.3d at 758. 
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cases. A position generally reserved for the 
Court of Criminal Appeals.224 
 
As a result, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined 
that the rule of necessity required them to take 
jurisdiction in this case to issue a stay of execution 
pending the outcome of the civil challenge to the 
confidentiality statute.225 For the first time in the state’s 
history, the Oklahoma Supreme Court took jurisdiction 
in a death penalty appeal.226 Unfortunately, the stay of 
execution was not the end of the matter. 
 In the final opinion issued before the executions of 
Lockett and Warner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
appeared to backpedal. The supreme court reversed the 
trial court’s decision, which held section 22.1015(B) 
unconstitutional.227 The supreme court also dissolved its 
stay of execution.228 The concurrence rings of “I told you 
so,” when Justice Taylor writes: 
 
I warned this Court in my previous 
dissents against crossing the Rubicon and 
now that crossing has caused a quagmire. 
Had this Court transferred all issues in 
this appeal to the Court of Criminal 
Appeals as I previously advocated, the 
matter would have been resolved without 
this Court ignoring precedent and the 
Court of Criminal Appeals’ role in our 
judicial system.229 
 
                                               
224 Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (Okla. 2014) (emphasis in 
original). 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 62 (Taylor, J., dissenting). 
227 Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 491 (Okla. 2014). 
228 Id. at 492. 
229 Id. at 493 (Taylor, J., concurring). 
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 Why did the court experience such a rapid about-
face regarding these jurisdictional issues? Between the 
opinion issuing a stay of execution on April 21, 2014, and 
the opinion dissolving the stay of execution on April 23, 
2014, some unusual events transpired in the governance 
of Oklahoma. First, Governor Mary Fallin proclaimed 
that she would not comply with the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court’s stay of execution, stating, “I cannot give effect to 
the order by that honorable court.”230 Let that sink in: 
The executive branch of Oklahoma refused to comply 
with the stay of execution issued by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, and would execute the inmates 
regardless, by reasoning that the supreme court’s 
“attempted stay of execution is outside the constitutional 
authority of that body” and that only an order by the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would be binding 
in this case.231 The next day Representative Mike 
Christian of the Oklahoma legislature began 
impeachment proceedings against the justices in the 
majority opinion issuing the stay of execution.232 As a 
result, the supreme court reversed its position and 
allowed the executions to proceed, despite the secrecy of 
the drugs—the very same drugs that caused Warner’s 
last word to be, “My body is on fire.”233 
 What ultimately caused this jurisdictional hot 
potato was the insertion of a civil suit into a death row 
case. The Oklahoma Supreme Court felt compelled by 
necessity to enter the “quagmire” of a suit requesting a 
stay of execution in order to decide the constitutional 
implications of the government’s policy forbidding 
disclosure of the lethal injection drugs. Events like this 
could not occur in the federal system. Every Article III 
                                               
230 Andrew Cohen, Oklahoma Just Neutered its State Supreme 
Court, THE WEEK, (Apr. 29, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/ 
447457/oklahoma-just-neutered-state-supreme-court. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Murphy, supra note 15. 
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court has the authority to decide the entire controversy 
(subject to subject matter jurisdiction) regardless of the 
civil or criminal aspects. A federal court may struggle to 
determine which rules of procedure may apply, but there 
is no question as to which court has the ability to hear a 
case. While the story of Charles Warner and Clayton 
Lockett is certainly a dramatic example of the pitfalls of 
bifurcated courts of last resort, there are others that 
generate less controversy. 
 In Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the court of criminal 
appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition, 
a demand for a change of custody hearing for a juvenile 
who had been adjudicated delinquent and a ward of the 
state.234 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals does not have 
general supervisory jurisdiction of lower courts, and 
cannot hear cases that do not arise out of criminal 
matters.235 It is important to note that had this appeal 
originated from an adjudication of delinquency or 
certification to stand trial as an adult, the result would 
have been different. But because the matter was instead 
a subsequent court action where the father sought to 
return his son to his custody, there was no longer court of 
criminal appeals jurisdiction.  
A jurisdictional tug-of-war between the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals that remains unresolved is that of contempt, 
which, as already noted, has aspects of both criminal and 
civil jurisdiction. Contempt, according to the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, is sui generis and not criminal. In the 
federal system, contempt can be either criminal or civil. 
The distinction lies in whether the purpose is to punish 
or to induce compliance. 
In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Owens, the 
dispute arose out of the contempt conviction of a certain 
                                               
234 595 P.2d 416, 418 (Okla. 1978). 
235 Id. at 419. 
49
et al.: V12 I2 (Winter 2018)
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2018
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2 
 
 
[200] 
Mr. O. O. Owens, who published defamatory statements 
about some of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s 
members.236 From a federal perspective, the purpose was 
to punish Mr. Owens for his statements. Owens filed a 
habeas petition with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals after being found in contempt by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court.237 The supreme court directed a writ of 
prohibition to the court of criminal appeals regarding the 
habeas petition, but the court of criminal appeals 
proceeded anyway and ordered Owens’s release.238 Once 
again, here is an instance in which the constitutionally-
superior Oklahoma Supreme Court is defied by the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. One can hardly 
blame the court of criminal appeals, however, because 
the punishment of Mr. Owens for his defamatory 
statements appears to be criminal through any lens. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court subsequently 
quashed the order of release in Dancy v. Owens.239 
Fortunately, in this case—juxtaposed with the Lockett v. 
Evans saga—the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
did not act in further contravention of the holding of the 
supreme court.240 Less fortunate is the fact that there 
still remains jurisdictional confusion with regard to 
contempt because the court of criminal appeals held that 
contempt is a misdemeanor in Roselle v. State241 and the 
supreme court still maintained that contempt is sui 
generis in Young v. Woodson.242 As noted above in my 
                                               
236 State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Owens, 256 P. 704, 705 (Okla. 
1927). 
237 See Ricketts, supra note 193, at 216. 
238 See generally Ex parte Owens, 258 P. 758 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1927). 
239 258 P. 879 (1927). 
240 See Ricketts, supra note 193, at 217 (noting that it was not 
until forty years after Dancy that the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court once again addressed contempt). 
241 503 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972). 
242 519 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1974). 
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discussion of contempt in Texas, it is often difficult to 
determine whether contempt is civil or criminal. But once 
again, the difficulty is exacerbated when two courts of 
last resort have to decide the question. 
 
III. Attempts to Eliminate Bifurcated Courts 
A. Texas 
 
 Texas has not been silent in its desire to eliminate 
the bifurcated court system. There have been four 
distinct proposals in the past twenty years to eliminate 
the bifurcated court system, some introduced more than 
once.243 The 1993 effort proposed to eliminate the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals and transfer all criminal cases 
to the Texas Supreme Court. A 1999 proposal would have 
merged the two courts into one high court composed of 
fifteen justices: seven would be appointed by the 
governor, seven would be elected, and the chief justice 
would be appointed and had to be from a different district 
than the previous appointment.244 In 2003, the proposal 
was substantially the same as 1993—eliminate the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals and transfer jurisdiction to 
the Texas Supreme Court.245 In 2011 and 2013, the same 
bill to eliminate the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was 
introduced.246 Unfortunately, none of the bills presented 
received any real consideration.247 
 
 
 
                                               
243 Bill Raftery, Trying to Eliminate the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals: Will Fourth Attempt in 20 years Succeed?, 
GAVEL TO GAVEL (Dec. 6, 2012), http://gaveltogavel.us/ 
2012/12/06/trying-to-eliminate-the-texas-court-of-criminal-
appeals-will-fourth-attempt-in-20-years-succeed/. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 See id. (noting that only a few bills even received a hearing). 
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B. Oklahoma 
 
 Oklahoma, despite the controversies it has 
endured, has had far less legislative attempts to 
eliminate its bifurcated court structure. Although it has 
been criticized on record as early as 1919 at a meeting of 
the Oklahoma State Bar Association,248 there have only 
been two instances of proposed reforms since the Sneed 
plan in 1967.249 One was an attempt to create a third 
court of last resort specifically for capital cases.250 
Oklahoma’s other attempt to modify its court structure 
occurred in 2012; the proposal called for the elimination 
of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals as well as the 
transfer of the power of constitutional review by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court to an ad hoc court of 
constitutional review created by the legislature.251 
 
IV. Analysis 
 
 A bifurcated court system causes unique 
jurisdictional “quagmires.” Bifurcating criminal and civil 
jurisdiction is usually intuitive and simple in the vast 
majority of cases, but there are enough significant issues 
                                               
248 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE 
OKLAHOMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 126 (Walter Lybrand, 
ed.1919) (discussing a wholescale replacement of the 
Oklahoma judiciary, including a single supreme court). 
249 See Simpson, supra note 106 (noting that the Sneed plan 
was defeated).  
250 H.R.J. Res. 1022, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015) 
(introduced by the same individual who introduced articles of 
impeachment against the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 
response to the Lockett debacle). 
251 See S.J. Res. 83, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2012); Bill Raftery, 
Recent Legislative Efforts to Eliminate, or Create, Bifurcated 
Criminal and Civil Appellate Courts, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Apr. 30, 
2014), http://gaveltogavel.us/2014/04/30/recent-legislative-efforts-
to-eliminate-or-create-bifurcated-criminal-and-civil-appellate-
courts/. 
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to justify greater scrutiny of the system. Oklahoma and 
Texas are the only two states in the union that maintain 
this judicial system. No other state (including those with 
large populations such as California, New York, and 
Florida) maintains a bifurcated system of courts of last 
resort. If the overwhelming majority of states and the 
federal system maintain a single court of last resort, 
there might be good reason for Oklahoma and Texas to 
consider following the crowd.  
Texas and Oklahoma suffer from failures to 
distinguish between civil and criminal jurisdiction in 
cases that maintain aspects of both. These cases create 
confusion for litigants as well as inter-judicial warring. 
Texas and Oklahoma do not have a compelling 
justification for maintaining bifurcated courts and should 
either combine the two courts into one, or develop a 
bifurcated system of intermediate appellate courts, with 
one court of last resort that has full appellate jurisdiction 
for all matters. 
  When one looks at the cases listed in Part II, one 
can find a unifying theme in the jurisdictional 
quandaries in which these courts have found themselves. 
In every single case outlined above, there have been 
aspects of both civil and criminal jurisdiction. In re Reece 
involved contempt in the context of a civil deposition.252 
This case arose out of a civil case, but was essentially a 
habeas petition, which the Texas Supreme Court 
generally cannot hear.253 However, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals refused to hear the habeas petition 
because it determined the case was civil in nature, 
arising from a civil case.254 In Oklahoma, contempt 
jurisdiction is still unresolved. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court determined that contempt is sui generis,255 but the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided that 
                                               
252 In Re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011). 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 362. 
255 Young v. Woodson, 519 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1974). 
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contempt is a misdemeanor and thus under its sole 
jurisdiction.256 
 One might point to the federal system and suggest 
that contempt is a difficult distinction even for a unified 
court system.257 This underscores my point. If it is 
difficult for a single court, it is even more complicated for 
a bifurcated system. At the end of the process, at least 
the litigant has the promise of finality in a unified 
system. The U.S. Supreme Court can make a 
determination and it will be the end of the matter. In 
Oklahoma and Texas, the litigant still does not know! If 
past performance is evidence of future conduct, Texas’s 
and Oklahoma’s high courts will play judicial hot potato 
again. 
 Other examples where the federal courts have 
struggled to determine the difference between civil and 
criminal jurisdiction include: appeals from criminal 
forfeiture,258 appeals from firearms prohibitions imposed 
on felons,259 and appeals from denials of requests to 
release grand jury transcripts for use in a habeas 
proceeding.260 In each of these cases there are aspects of 
both civil and criminal jurisdiction, yet the firearms 
appeals and the jury transcript requests were both held 
to be civil and the forfeiture of assets appeal was held to 
be criminal. In Texas and Oklahoma, the supreme court 
must think about how the court of criminal appeals would 
rule, and vice versa, in order to prevent jurisdictional 
holes or gaps from propagating. Reece is a perfect 
example. The Texas Supreme Court had to contort its 
                                               
256 Rosell v. State, 503 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972). 
257 See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827–28 (1994). 
258 United States v. De Los Santos, 260 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
259 Palma v. U.S., Dept. of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 228 
F.3d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2000). 
260 United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
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jurisdiction to meet a gap in habeas jurisdiction.261 At 
least unified systems will generate an answer that will 
effectively guide litigants, and keep them from having to 
“roll the dice.”262 
 Litigants themselves struggle to navigate the 
system. In State v. Morales,263 the Attorney General of 
Texas appealed to both the Texas Supreme Court and the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, not knowing which 
court had jurisdiction. In Bretz v. State, a litigant 
appealed an order to return property that he was 
acquitted of stealing.264 One could reasonably assume 
that because the order came from a criminal trial, the 
appeal would be to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 
Unfortunately, Texas maintains that this appeal belongs 
in a civil appeals court, not criminal. Texas does follow 
the federal rule,265 but in Texas, one has to file an entirely 
new motion and appeal to an entirely different court if 
the original appeal was brought in the wrong court. In 
federal court, a litigant could simply amend her motion 
and remain in front of the same court. 
 Because it is difficult to determine which court of 
last resort has jurisdiction, litigants have to expend more 
resources identifying the appropriate appellate forum, 
and judicial resources are wasted determining which 
court has jurisdiction. The Lockett/Warner debacle is a 
perfect example: A case was bounced around for years 
with the courts fighting over who did or did not have 
jurisdiction. 
Texas and Oklahoma have experienced inter-
judicial warring because of their bifurcated court 
structures. In re Reece is an example where the Texas 
Supreme Court essentially had to step in and take 
                                               
261 In Re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011). 
262 See supra note 192. 
263 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994). 
264 508 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
265 See, e.g., United States v. Madden, 95 F.3d 38, 39 n.1 (10th 
Cir. 1996). 
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jurisdiction because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
refused.266 In Oklahoma, Lockett v. Evans passed in front 
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court six times after being 
sent to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on 
multiple occasions.267 In Texas, it is understandable that 
the courts of last resort must tread lightly in deferring to 
the other court. The two courts are coequal, both provided 
for in the constitution and both with final appellate 
jurisdiction in their respective spheres.268 In Texas there 
is no ultimate authority to decide jurisdictional mistakes. 
If both courts deny jurisdiction, there is no court to hear 
the case. This is a serious problem that could only be 
resolved through a constitutional amendment, because 
interpretation of jurisdiction is a constitutional matter. 
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court has the 
constitutional power to decide final jurisdictional issues, 
it appears to be illusory. The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
made a final adjudication in Lockett v. Evans, holding 
that the court of criminal appeals had jurisdiction, yet 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals refused to 
exercise its jurisdiction in that case.269 
 Thus, we find that the expense and headache 
created by the bifurcated system is not worth the candle. 
The system is inefficient, confusing, and contentious. The 
arguments in favor of the system are dispelled below.  
 The argument that Texas and Oklahoma require 
bifurcated courts to handle a more significant caseload is 
not a compelling one. For instance, the California 
Supreme Court received 9,739 matters in 2013.270 By 
comparison, the Texas Supreme Court received only 778 
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals received 5,875, 
                                               
266 See supra Part II.A. 
267 Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 493 (Okla. 2014) (Taylor, J., 
concurring). 
268 See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2–3, 5. 
269 Lockett, 330 P.3d 488. 
270 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2013 CALIFORNIA COURT 
STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS xvi (2013). 
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for a total court of last resort case disposition of 6,653 
matters.271 This shows that California, with one court, 
was able to complete 3,086 more matters than Texas with 
two courts. Oklahoma, being a far less populous state, 
also cannot justify its bifurcated system based on the 
number of matters disposed. 
 The argument that a bifurcated court of last resort 
system increases the expertise of the judiciary does not 
outweigh the problems such a system creates. There is 
little evidence to suggest that federal courts suffer from 
a lack of expertise in disposing of criminal or civil 
matters, except for the occasional issue such as ERISA or 
patent litigation.272 Even if Oklahoma and Texas want to 
keep their expert judges in criminal and civil matters, 
they could do so through specialized mid-level appeals 
courts, which I will outline infra. 
 In light of these jurisdictional issues and the 
examples from the vast majority of other states, my 
recommendation is that both Texas and Oklahoma 
should abolish their bifurcated court system. There 
should be three constitutional courts including a trial 
court of general jurisdiction, an appeals court with 
general appellate jurisdiction, and one supreme court 
with general appellate jurisdiction. This would require 
the elimination of the current system in Oklahoma where 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court handles all appeals and 
has discretion in passing appeals down to the Oklahoma 
Court of Appeals. 
                                               
271 OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL 
REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2013 24, 30 
(2013). 
272 See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition Insights Into 
Judicial Decisionmaking in Employee Benefits Cases, 3 LAB. & 
EMP. L. F. 2 (2013) (arguing for specialized judges to handle 
ERISA litigation); William Watkins, We Need a Specialized 
Patent Trial Court, LAW 360 (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/583409/we-need-a-
specialized-patent-trial-court. 
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 Texas would eliminate a significant number of its 
own courts, including county courts and justice of the 
peace courts. I also recommend that Texas reduce the 
total number of courts of appeal from the current 
fourteen to a more manageable six or seven. Texas should 
increase the number of judges on the courts of appeal, 
and limit the districts to readily discernable geographic 
and demographic areas. This will decrease the role of the 
Texas Supreme Court as an arbiter of district splits and 
allow it to grant certiorari on appeals that present novel 
and important issues. 
 If, on the other hand, Texas and Oklahoma would 
like to maintain the specialization in having a bifurcated 
appeals system, there is still room to clean up the 
jurisdictional conflicts. In the late 1960s, Tennessee and 
Alabama both instituted bifurcated mid-level appellate 
courts.273 Neither state has attempted to amend or 
eliminate its system in the past twenty years.274 
 There are numerous benefits of a bifurcated mid-
level appeals court with a single court of last resort. The 
mid-level appeals courts would develop significant 
specialties in their respective jurisdiction, thus 
maintaining one of the principal arguments in favor of 
the bifurcated courts of last resort while decreasing 
jurisdictional headaches. The courts would have less 
work, and thus could reach a disposition more quickly.275 
Additionally, the supreme court may come to be viewed 
as playing more of an administrative role, with the mid-
level courts acting similar to a court of last resort. I 
                                               
273 See Raftery, supra note 243 (listing both Alabama and 
Tennessee as states that have bifurcated mid-level appellate 
courts). 
274 Id. 
275 For example, Tennessee’s mid-level courts of appeal 
maintained near or above a 100% clearance rate. See 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE TENNESSEE JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2013‐2014 11, 13 
(2014). 
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would, however, allow mandatory supreme court 
jurisdiction for death penalty cases due to the incredibly 
sensitive nature of those cases. 
 The mid-level court would in most instances be 
the last court that litigants see. Without a right of appeal 
to the supreme court (except in capital cases), the mid-
level appeals courts would have final authority on nearly 
all decisions. Only in cases where the supreme court 
either finds serious errors in reasoning, circuit splits, or 
jurisdictional mistakes would it review a case. Thus, 
these specialized courts would for most purposes remain 
the last court to which litigants argue. 
If there are questions regarding jurisdictional 
issues between the mid-level courts (which, as we have 
seen from bifurcated courts of last resort, is inevitable) 
the supreme court could easily dispose of the 
jurisdictional issue and the lower courts would be bound. 
There would be no debacles like Reece or Lockett because 
the supreme court would have ultimate authority on all 
issues of state law. 
For example, if we apply the novel mid-level 
bifurcated structure to the facts of Reece, where the Texas 
Supreme Court used a tenuous interpretation of its 
mandamus power to prevent a significant gap in 
appellate review, there would have been a different 
outcome.276 If the mid-level court of criminal appeals 
denied jurisdiction, the civil appeals court would likely 
have never entered the picture. The appeal of the denial 
of habeas would go up to the unified supreme court of last 
resort, where that court presumably would have 
determined that the court of criminal appeals did have 
jurisdiction in this case. Because the unified supreme 
court is a higher court and sets binding precedent for the 
court of criminal appeals, that court would have heard 
the case and disposed of the issue. 
Cases like Bretz v. State would also be avoided. 
Litigants would have the knowledge that if a mistake 
                                               
276 See supra Part II.A. 
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concerning jurisdiction was made on their part, the 
supreme court could remand to the proper court. 
Additionally, when the mistaken jurisdiction of the 
litigant is clear to the mid-level court reviewing the case, 
Texas and Oklahoma could institute a process similar to 
the process set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1631.277 This would 
allow a civil court to transfer a case to a criminal court 
and vice versa.278 The result would be preservation of the 
case to avoid timing issues in appeals. Further, if there 
were a mistake on the part of the transferring court, the 
supreme court would have the authority to make a final 
determination and remand for adjudication. There would 
still remain extra expense in litigation, but there also 
would be the added benefit of judicial expertise in 
specialized courts. 
One might question whether the outcome of 
Lockett would have been any different in a system of 
bifurcated intermediate courts. I argue that it would. On 
the first appeal, Lockett would appeal to either the 
criminal or civil court of appeals. If he appealed to the 
wrong court, or the court incorrectly determined that it 
did not have jurisdiction, the case would be appealed up 
to the unified supreme court. This court would be able to 
make a single determination regarding which court had 
jurisdiction, and its decree would be binding law on all 
parties. There would not be the denial of the order by the 
court of criminal appeals because the unified supreme 
court is objectively higher. Even if the mid-level court of 
criminal appeals defied the order of the unified supreme 
court (which is highly unlikely), the supreme court would 
have jurisdiction to decide the case itself, thus 
eliminating the tenuous judicial acrobatics necessary to 
shoehorn civil into criminal, or vice versa. As Justice 
Jackson famously wrote, “We are not final because we are 
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
                                               
277 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982). 
278 Id. 
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final.”279 One court of last resort eliminates a contest of 
equals jockeying for position and creates finality binding 
on all. 
V. Conclusion 
 
 “Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice 
is as old as law. Not to go outside our own legal system, 
discontent has an ancient and unbroken pedigree.”280 The 
Texas and Oklahoma judiciary systems are problematic. 
In Oklahoma, the result of a judicial hot potato led to the 
botched execution of a convicted murderer using 
experimental drugs.281 In Texas, the Texas Supreme 
Court used mandamus jurisdiction for what was 
essentially a habeas petition, because the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction to 
hear a writ of habeas corpus arising from an individual 
being held in contempt in an underlying civil trial, 
despite the fact that the purpose of the contempt order 
was criminal punishment.282 These jurisdictional issues 
affect real human beings and deserve the attention of 
legislators and reformers. Texas and Oklahoma should 
seriously consider amending their constitutions to 
reconstruct their judicial systems to contain only one 
court of last resort with general appellate jurisdiction in 
order to ensure there will always be a court to hear a case. 
  
                                               
279 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J. 
concurring). 
280 Orley R. Lilly, Jr., Some Thoughts for Judicial Reform in 
Oklahoma, 10 TULSA L. J. 91, 91 (1974) (quoting Roscoe Pound, 
The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration 
of Justice (1906)). 
281 See Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488 (Okla. 2014). 
282 See In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011). 
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ARTICLE 
 
THE DECLINE OF CIVIL 
DISCOURSE AND THE RISE OF 
EXTREMIST DEBATE 
WORDS MATTER 
 
Timothy W. Conner* 
 
 Most attorneys are familiar with the adage: “If the 
facts are against you, argue the law. If the law is against 
you, argue the facts. If the law and the facts are against 
you, pound the table and yell like hell.”1 We have entered 
                                               
* Timothy W. Conner has served as a judge on the Tennessee 
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board since August 1, 2014. 
Prior to that, Judge Conner practiced law for twenty-two years 
in the areas of workers’ compensation, workplace exposure 
claims, wills and estates, and employment discrimination. He 
has been an Adjunct Professor at The University of Tennessee 
College of Law since 2013, where he teaches the course on 
Workers’ Compensation Law. He received his bachelor’s degree 
from Boston University in 1988, cum laude with distinction, 
and his Juris Doctor from Wake Forest University School of 
Law in 1992. The opinions expressed in this article are those of 
Judge Conner individually and are not intended to reflect the 
collective opinion of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation 
Appeals Board. 
1 This adage derives from CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 
181 (1937) (“‘If the law is against you, talk about the evidence,’ 
63
et al.: V12 I2 (Winter 2018)
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2018
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2 
 
 
[214] 
an age where, in any given debate, proponents of a 
particular position no longer seem to care about the facts 
or the law. They bypass all reason, attempt no civil 
discourse, and proceed straight to yelling. This proclivity 
knows no political, generational, or socio-economic 
bounds. It is an equal-opportunity philosophy that 
threatens to tear down the very foundations on which our 
representative republic was built; for when the objective 
of the discourse is simply to shout down the other side, 
very little of substance can be accomplished. Why have 
we digressed to this point? Can we change course and re-
introduce the vital concept of respect for well-reasoned 
opinions, even if they are diametrically opposed to our 
own? Is it too late to salvage human dignity in the public 
sphere? 
 In my tenth-grade debate class, we discussed the 
elements of an effective argument. We learned that great 
debaters were the ones who had a good grasp of the facts, 
understood both sides of an argument, and methodically 
laid a foundation in support of their position. Ineffective 
debaters were the ones who did not understand the facts, 
relied on unsubstantiated sources, and, more often than 
not, attacked the other side’s motives and character, 
neither of which is relevant to the substance of the issues 
being debated. Attacking your opponent, we were told, is 
a sure sign of your own weakness. 
 Despite this maxim of debate, individuals across 
a range of professions, socio-economic groups, and 
political parties have no reservations about using the 
“yell like hell” philosophy as the first, and sometimes 
only, course of action. Whether they are politicians, 
comedians, musicians, or authors, they have filled the 
public forum with anger, accusations, unfair generalities, 
and unfounded conclusions about the character of “the 
                                               
said a battered barrister. ‘If the evidence is against you, talk 
about the law, and, since you ask me, if the law and the 
evidence are both against you, then pound on the table and yell 
like hell.’”). 
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other side.” They oppose the other side’s positions not on 
merit, but on their hatred of “the other side.” A few recent 
examples illustrate the escalating problem: (1) a 
presidential candidate accused another nation of 
“bringing drugs, and bringing crime, and their rapists” to 
America;2 (2) another presidential candidate, though 
acknowledging ahead of time that her comment would be 
“grossly generalistic,” stated that half of the supporters 
of the other candidate belonged in a “basket of 
deplorables;”3 (3) a California political leader led a 
profane chant against the President while he and a crowd 
of supporters used a profane gesture;4 (4) a late-night 
comedian used his national platform to insult the 
President with a series of escalating comments too 
offensive to reprint here;5 (5) a musician included in his 
concert a message displayed in giant letters across 
several large video screens disparaging the President;6 
and (6) following a terrorist attack in London in June 
                                               
2 Adam Gabbatt, Donald Trump’s Tirade on Mexico’s ‘Drugs 
and Rapists’ Outrages U.S. Latinos, THE GUARDIAN (June 16, 
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/16/ 
donald-trump-mexico-presidential-speech-latino-hispanic.  
3 Angie Drobnic Holan, In Context: Hillary Clinton and the 
‘Basket of Deplorables’, POLITIFACT (Sept. 11, 2016), 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/sep/11/ 
context-hillary-clinton-basket-deplorables/.  
4 Peter W. Stevenson, California Democrats Give Trump the Finger, 
WASH. POST (May 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-fix/wp/2017/05/22/california-democrats-give-trump-the-
finger/?utm_term=.68888af76d0e. 
5 Sarah Taylor, Stephen Colbert Eviscerates Donald Trump in 
Vulgar, Insult-Laden Network TV Rant, THE BLAZE (May 2, 
2017), http://www.theblaze.com/news/2017/05/02/stephen-
colbert-eviscerates-donald-trump-in-vulgar-insult-laden-
network-tv-rant/. 
6 William Cummings, What Blew Up the Liberal and 
Conservative Media Bubbles This Week, USA TODAY (June 1, 
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/ 
2017/06/01/this-week-trending-liberal-conservative-posts/ 
102355218/. 
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2017, a Louisiana congressman posted in a Facebook 
message that “radicalized Islamic suspect[s]” should be 
denied entry into America and that we should “[h]unt 
them, identify them, and kill them. Kill them all.”7 I could 
continue ad nauseum, because there are any number of 
websites dedicated to documenting the ridiculing of 
various individuals or groups, including climate 
scientists on one side or the other, politicians of all kinds, 
celebrities, those of various religious faiths, and many 
others.8 
 The advent of social media has compounded the 
problem. The perceived potential to communicate, quite 
literally, to the entire technology-connected world is an 
intoxicant many cannot resist. This potential inflates 
one’s sense of self-importance and emboldens one to say 
or write whatever it takes to “go viral.” This desire 
naturally leads to extremism because a well-reasoned, 
                                               
7 Ken Stickney, Louisiana Congressman on Radicalized Islam: 
‘Kill Them All’, USA TODAY (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/
06/05/louisiana-congressman-radicalized-islam-kill-them-
all/102519398/. 
8 I would be remiss in not acknowledging that, sometimes, 
actions speak louder than words. Within a forty-eight hour 
period of the initial drafting of this article, I noted one celebrity 
who posed for photographs holding a likeness of the 
decapitated, bloody head of the President, see Libby Hill, Kathy 
Griffin Shocks in Gory Photo Shoot with Donald Trump’s (fake) 
Head, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/ 
entertainment/la-et-entertainment-news-updates-may-kathy-
griffin-shocks-in-gory-photo-1496183372-htmlstory.html, 
while another individual hung a noose inside the National 
Museum of African American History and Culture. Lorraine 
Boissoneault, Noose Found in National Museum of African 
American History and Culture, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 31, 
2017), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/ 
noose-found-national-museum-african-american-history-and-
culture-180963519/). Each act oozes the kind of vitriol that 
suppresses thoughtful discourse on important issues. 
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calm, methodical approach rarely rises to the top of a 
search engine result. In a recent example, a host on a 
prominent cable news network responded to a tweet from 
the President with his own tweet using vulgar language 
and calling the President “an embarrassment to 
America,” “a stain on the presidency,” and “an 
embarrassment to humankind.”9 The host later 
apologized, but not before his tweet went viral.10 
 Moreover, the ability of any individual or group to 
create its own “publication” at little cost and disseminate 
it widely has led to the predominance of extreme 
language and “fake news.” Many such websites, blogs, 
posts, and other similar media have no need of and no use 
for journalistic integrity. These new media, in turn, cause 
once-respected news organizations to lean toward 
extreme fringes in an effort to compete with the more 
sensationalistic elements on the internet. This pushes 
venerated reporters to blur the line between fact and 
opinion. In short, the media is caught in a “spin cycle” 
that will not slow down. The perceived demand for 
constant access to new and salacious news stories means 
that in-depth investigative journalism, which mandates 
a time-consuming, methodical approach to interviewing 
and verifying sources, is shunted to the side in favor of 
whatever rumor or innuendo is the “flavor of the 
moment.” Owners and stockholders of legitimate media 
demand revenue; revenue is generated by advertisers 
who require ratings and increased subscription bases, 
which apparently are generated only through “gotcha” 
headlines, unverified speculation, and outrage. We, the 
consumers, watch, click on, purchase, and download this 
drivel. And on it goes. 
                                               
9 Josh Feldman, CNN Host Reza Aslan Apologizes for Calling 
Trump a ‘Piece of Sh*t’, MEDIAITE (June 4, 2017), 
https://www.mediaite.com/online/cnn-host-reza-aslan-
apologizes-for-comments-calling-trump-a-piece-of-sht/. 
10 Id. 
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 One commentator summarized his thoughts on 
this topic in a recent article: 
 
[W]e’re moving toward two Americas—one 
that ruthlessly (and occasionally illegally) 
suppresses dissenting speech and the 
other that is dangerously close to believing 
that the opposite of political correctness 
isn’t a fearless expression of truth but 
rather the fearless expression of ideas best 
calculated to enrage your opponents. 
 . . . For one side, a true free-speech 
culture is a threat to feelings, sensitivities, 
and social justice. The other side waves 
high the banner of “free speech” to 
sometimes elevate the worst voices to the 
highest platforms—not so much to protect 
the First Amendment as to infuriate the 
hated “snowflakes” and trigger the most 
hysterical overreactions.11  
 
 What does the decline in civil discourse have to do 
with the law? Consider the impact extreme language has 
had on national immigration policy. In International 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,12 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit framed the issue 
as follows: “whether [the Constitution] protects Plaintiffs’ 
right to challenge an Executive Order that in text speaks 
with vague words of national security, but in context 
drips with religious intolerance, animus, and 
                                               
11 David French, David French: The Threat to Free Speech, 
COMMENTARY MAG. (June 27, 2017), http://www. 
commentarymagazine.com/politics-ideas/david-french-threat-
free-speech/. 
12 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. granted and stayed in part, 
137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacated as moot, No. 16-1436, 2017 U.S. 
LEXIS 6265 (Oct. 10, 2017). 
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discrimination.”13 The case addressed President Trump’s 
executive orders that seek to prohibit “foreign nationals 
who ‘bear hostile attitudes’ toward [America]” from 
entering the country for a certain period of time.14 In 
analyzing whether the plaintiffs could pursue a cause of 
action to stop the implementation of these orders, a 
majority of the Fourth Circuit found it relevant and 
probative to consider “public statements by the President 
and his advisors and representatives at different points 
in time, both before and after the election and President 
Trump’s assumption of office.”15 After recounting various 
public statements in which President Trump described 
“hatred [and] danger coming into our country,”16 and 
claimed that “Islam hates us,”17 the court agreed with the 
plaintiffs’ claim that there was an “anti-Muslim message 
animating [the second executive order].”18  
 Following an extensive review of what the court 
believed to be binding precedent on the constitutional 
issue, the majority concluded that if the plaintiffs make 
“an affirmative showing of bad faith” that is “plausibly 
alleged with sufficient particularity” against the 
government’s proposed action, then the court may “‘look 
behind’ the challenged action to assess its ‘facially 
legitimate’ justification.”19 The court then determined 
that it must “step away from our deferential posture and  
 
 
 
                                               
13 Id. at 572. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 575. 
16 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 7, 2015, 
1:47 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/ 
673982228163072000?lang=en.  
17 857 F.3d at 576. 
18 Id. at 575–76, 576, 578. 
19 Id. at 590–91 (quoting Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 
(2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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look behind the stated reason for the challenged action.”20 
The court noted that 
 
Plaintiffs point to ample evidence that 
national security is not the true reason for 
[the second executive order], including, 
among other things, then-candidate 
Trump’s numerous campaign statements 
expressing animus towards the Islamic 
faith; his proposal to ban Muslims from 
entering the United States; his subsequent 
explanation that he would effectuate this 
ban by targeting “territories” instead of 
Muslims directly; the issuance of [the first 
executive order], which targeted certain 
majority-Muslim nations and included a 
preference for religious minorities; [and] 
an advisor’s statement that the President 
had asked him to find a way to ban 
Muslims in a legal way. . . .21 
 
 The court then concluded that “Plaintiffs have 
more than plausibly alleged that [the second executive 
order’s] stated national security interest was provided in 
bad faith . . . .”22 Although the court acknowledged that it 
could not engage in “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s 
heart of hearts,”23 it had a duty to consider “the action’s 
‘historical context’ and ‘the specific sequence of events 
leading to [its] passage.’”24 Moreover, the court 
determined that “as a reasonable observer, a court has a 
‘reasonable memor[y],’ and it cannot ‘turn a blind eye to 
                                               
20 Id. at 591. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 592. 
23 Id. at 593 (quoting McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 
844, 862 (2005)). 
24 Id. at 593 (alteration in original) (quoting Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 595 (1987)). 
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the context in which [the action] arose.’”25 The Fourth 
Circuit concluded that 
 
[t]he evidence in the record, viewed from 
the standpoint of the reasonable observer, 
creates a compelling case that [the second 
executive order’s] primary purpose is 
religious. Then-candidate Trump’s 
campaign statements reveal that on 
numerous occasions, he expressed anti-
Muslim sentiment, as well as his intent, if 
elected, to ban Muslims from the United 
States. For instance, on December 7, 2015, 
Trump posted on his campaign website a 
“Statement on Preventing Muslim 
Immigration,” in which he “call[ed] for a 
total and complete shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States until our 
representatives can figure out what is 
going on” and remarked, “[I]t is obvious to 
anybody that the hatred is beyond 
comprehension. . . . [O]ur country cannot 
be the victims of horrendous attacks by 
people that believe only in Jihad, and have 
no sense of reason or respect for human 
life.”26 
 
 In response to the Government’s arguments that 
the stated purpose of the executive order was secular in 
nature, that it banned persons of all religions from the 
designated countries, and that it did not ban Muslims 
from countries other than the designated countries, the 
majority commented that the executive order’s “practical 
operation is not severable from the myriad statements 
explaining its operation as intended to bar Muslims from 
                                               
25 Id. (quoting McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866). 
26 Id. at 594. 
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the United States.”27 Regardless of one’s political 
perspective, religious views, or thoughts on the legal 
analysis employed by the Fourth Circuit, there can be no 
doubt that the primary focus of this important legal case 
was on one thing: language.28 A candidate’s use of words 
that some considered ill-advised and inflammatory 
resulted in a United States Court of Appeals blocking 
implementation of an executive order that otherwise 
constituted a facially legitimate exercise of executive 
discretion. Words matter. 
 Though certainly not on the same scale as 
International Refugee, other recent litigation has hinged 
on the ill-advised use of words. In 2014, a high school 
student in Minnesota was suspended due to a two-word 
tweet (“actually yes”) he sent off campus and after school 
hours in response to a Twitter inquiry about a rumored 
occurrence between the student and a teacher.29 The 
student sued, alleging, among other things, that his First 
Amendment rights had been violated.30 The school 
district responded to the complaint by arguing that the 
student’s tweet was “obscene” and therefore not protected 
                                               
27 Id. at 597. 
28 It should be noted that three judges on the Fourth Circuit 
dissented in International Refugee, arguing that the court had 
no precedential basis for “look[ing] behind” the Government’s 
“‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ exercises of executive 
discretion,” id. at 639 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)), and had no 
just cause for “consideration of campaign statements to recast 
a later-issued executive order . . . .” Id. at 639 (Neimeyer, J., 
dissenting). 
29 Cyrus Farivar, Lawsuit Over Two-Word Tweet—“actually 
yes”—Can Move Ahead, Judge Finds, ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 15, 
2015), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/08/lawsuit-
over-two-word-tweet-actually-yes-can-move-ahead-judge-
finds/. 
30 Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842, 
848 (D. Minn. 2015). 
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by the First Amendment.31 The district court cited 
Supreme Court precedent holding that “it is a highly 
appropriate function of public school education to 
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public 
discourse.”32 The district court concluded, however, that 
the tweet in question was not patently obscene and that 
the issue should be left for the jury to decide.33 
 Much of the debate surrounding the legal 
implications of word use and word choice can be traced 
back to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio,34  a 1969 free speech case. Clarence 
Brandenburg was a Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) leader in 
rural Ohio who invited a reporter to attend a KKK rally 
in 1964.35 Portions of the rally were recorded and 
broadcast on a local television station and Brandenburg 
was later convicted of “advocat[ing] . . . the duty, 
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or 
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of 
accomplishing industrial or political reform . . . .”36 The 
Supreme Court reversed Brandenburg’s conviction and 
declared the Ohio statute on which the conviction was 
based unconstitutional.37 In so holding, the Court stated, 
 
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State 
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of 
force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or 
                                               
31 Id. at 853 (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)). 
32 Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 
683 (1986)). 
33 Id. at 854. 
34 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
35 Id. at 445. 
36 Id. at 444–45 (alteration in original). 
37 Id. at 449. 
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producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action.38  
 
The Court then concluded: 
 
[W]e are here confronted with a statute 
which, by its own words and as applied, 
purports to punish mere advocacy and to 
forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, 
assembly with others merely to advocate 
the described type of action. Such a statute 
falls within the condemnation of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.39  
 
 However, there are limits to the First 
Amendment’s protective reach. In 2006, the Supreme 
Court of Michigan issued a controversial opinion 
addressing public comments made by an attorney about 
appellate judges who were hearing his client’s case.40 
After the attorney obtained a large jury verdict for a 
client in an earlier medical malpractice case, a three-
judge panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed 
the award and directed entry of a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict.41 The court of appeals 
commented in its decision that the conduct of the 
plaintiff’s attorney during the trial was “truly egregious” 
and that it “completely tainted the proceedings.”42 Within 
a few days of the release of this decision, on a then-daily 
radio program the attorney hosted on a local station, the 
attorney made highly derogatory and offensive comments 
about the three appellate court judges who issued the 
                                               
38 Id. at 447. 
39 Id. at 449.  
40 Grievance Adm’r v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 2006). 
41 Id. at 129. See generally Badalamenti v. William Beaumont 
Hosp.–Troy, 602 N.W.2d 854, 862 (1999). 
42 Badalamenti, 602 N.W.2d at 860; see also Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 
at 129. 
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opinion.43 Not surprisingly, Michigan’s Attorney 
Grievance Commission filed a formal complaint against 
the attorney, alleging that his public comments violated 
several provisions of the Michigan Rules of Professional 
Conduct.44 
 On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court of 
Michigan noted that the legal profession, unlike other 
professions, “impose[s] upon its members regulations 
concerning the nature of public comment.”45 “The First 
Amendment implications are easily understood in such a 
regulatory regime,” and the Supreme Court of Michigan 
“has attempted to appropriately draw the line between 
robust comment that is protected by the First 
Amendment and comment that undermines the integrity 
of the legal system.”46 The court concluded that “these 
rules are designed to prohibit only ‘undignified,’ 
‘discourteous,’ and ‘disrespectful’ conduct or remarks. 
These rules are a call to discretion and civility, not to 
silence or censorship, and they do not even purport to 
prohibit criticism.”47 The court then determined that the 
attorney’s disparaging comments about the three judges 
“warrants no First Amendment protection when 
balanced against this state’s compelling interest in 
maintaining public respect for the integrity of the legal 
process.”48 
 Finally, the majority sought to address the 
objections of its dissenting colleagues, who concluded 
                                               
43 Fieger, 719 N.W.2d at 129. 
44 Id. at 130. The subsequent disciplinary proceedings in 
Fieger, which involved an appeal to the Attorney Disciplinary 
Board in Michigan, are convoluted and irrelevant to this 
Article, and therefore this Article does not discuss those 
proceedings. See generally id. at 130–31. 
45 Id. at 131. 
46 Id. at 131–32. 
47 Id. at 135. 
48 Id. at 142 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 
(1968)). 
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that the attorney’s disparaging public comments should 
be protected by the First Amendment: 
 
 In their repudiation of “courtesy” 
and “civility” rules, the dissents would 
usher an entirely new legal culture into 
this state, a Hobbesian legal culture, the 
repulsiveness of which is only dimly 
limned by the offensive conduct that we see 
in this case. It is a legal culture in which, 
in a state such as Michigan with judicial 
elections, there would be a permanent 
political campaign for the bench, pitting 
lawyers against the judges of whom they 
disapprove. It is a legal culture in which 
rational and logical discourse would come 
increasingly to be replaced by epithets and 
coarse behavior, in which a profession that 
is already marked by declining standards 
of behavior would be subject to further 
erosion, and in which public regard for the 
system of law would inevitably be 
diminished over time.49 
 
 Additionally, our nation’s college campuses are 
increasingly marked by divisive, extreme, and abusive 
language, as well as attempted censorship: 
 
• In 2015, a professor at the University of Missouri 
attempted to prohibit a video journalist from 
recording video at a student protest. The professor 
yelled, “Who wants to help me get this reporter 
out of here? I need some muscle over here.”50 
                                               
49 Id. at 144. 
50 Justin Moyer, Michael Miller & Peter Holley, Mass Media 
Professor Under Fire for Confronting Video Journalist at Mizzou, 
WASH POST (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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• In 2015, a faculty training guide distributed by 
the University of California cautioned faculty 
members against using words and phrases that 
could result in “microaggressions,” including the 
phrase “America is the land of opportunity.”51 
 
• A 2016 Gallup poll found that thirty-one percent 
of college students say they frequently or 
occasionally hear someone at their college making 
“disrespectful, inappropriate or offensive 
comments” about others’ race, ethnicity, or 
religion, while fifty-four percent of students 
surveyed said the climate on their campus 
“prevents some people from saying what they 
believe.”52 
 
• In 2017, a professor at Evergreen State College 
sent an email (that was then posted to Twitter) 
objecting to an event called “Day of Absence,” in 
which white students and teachers were asked to 
leave campus for the day so that students of color 
could organize and attend discussions about 
race.53 Student protestors concluded the professor 
                                               
news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/10/video-shows-u-of-missouri-
protesters-and-journalism-professor-barring-media-coverage/ 
?utm_term=.7581e8f24914. 
51 Nick Gillespie, This Counts as a Microaggression: “America 
is the Land of Opportunity”, REASON FOUNDATION (JUNE 15, 
2015), http://reason.com/blog/2015/06/15/this-counts-as-a-
microaggression-america. 
52 GALLUP, FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS: A SURVEY OF U.S. 
COLLEGE STUDENTS AND U.S. ADULTS 4, 18 (2016). 
53 Susan Svrulga & Joe Heim, A Washington State College, 
Caught Up in Racial Turmoil, Remains Closed Friday After 
Threat of Violence, WASH POST (June 2, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/ 
06/02/evergreen-state-caught-up-in-racial-turmoil-remains-
closed-friday-after-threat-of-violence/?utm_term=.e517f9009028. 
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was racist and demanded he be fired, and threats 
of violence prompted the school to close for two 
days.54 
 
• In February 2017, a professor at Fresno State 
University tweeted, “to save American democracy, 
Drumpf must hang. The sooner and the higher, 
the better.”55 
 
• In 2017, two conservative commentators were 
banned from the campus of DePaul University for 
using “inflammatory speech.”56 
 
• Harvard’s campus newspaper, The Crimson, 
reported in June 2017 that ten students who had 
been admitted into the incoming freshmen class 
had their admissions rescinded when the school 
discovered sexually explicit and/or racially 
insensitive memes in a private Facebook chat.57  
 
 Despite this disturbing trend, an analysis by CNN 
reporter Eliott C. McLaughlin concluded that students 
“will listen to speakers they disagree with if they’re 
                                               
54 Id. 
55 Melissa Etehad, Fresno State Professor Placed on Leave After 
Tweeting “Drumpf Must Hang”, L.A. TIMES (April 19, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-fresno-professor-
paid-leave-20170419-story.html. 
56 Kassy Dillon, After Protests and Riots, Free Speech is MIA on 
College Campuses, THE HILL (Feb. 3, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/education/317719-after-
protests-and-riots-free-speech-is-mia-on-college-campuses. 
57 Hannah Natanson, Harvard Rescinds Acceptances for at 
Least Ten Students for Obscene Memes, HARV. CRIMSON (June 
5, 2017), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/6/5/2021-
offers-rescinded-memes/. 
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civil.”58 He cited as an example a 2015 speech Senator 
Bernie Sanders gave at Liberty University, a well-known 
Christian college in Virginia. One student commented 
that although she and most of her fellow students 
disagreed with Senator Sanders’s views on a variety of 
topics, she listened to his speech and thoughtfully 
considered his comments about alleviating poverty in 
light of her own beliefs, saying “[e]veryone I talked to was 
glad he came,” and that “[i]t’s important to communicate 
with those we disagree with.”59  
 Thus, there can be no doubt that the First 
Amendment is the great constitutional protector of free 
speech, as it should be, but it is not without its limits. For 
purposes of this article, the question is not whether 
divisive, rude, profane, or derogatory language is 
constitutional. In most instances, it is certainly protected 
speech. Instead, the question is whether, in an age where 
one’s words can be disseminated immediately to millions 
of people across multiple digital platforms, such language 
contributes anything useful to society. As Shakespeare’s 
great character Falstaff said, “The better part of valor is 
discretion . . . .”60   
 I believe a significant majority of Americans, who 
I dub the “Middle Majority,” abhor extremist, hate-filled 
rhetoric, regardless of which end of the political spectrum 
produces it. The average American, I maintain, finds the 
vitriol spewed by white supremacists as distasteful as the 
far-left’s radicalized malevolence directed at our current 
President. As one commentator explained, “[r]age and 
sanctimony always spread like a virus, and become 
                                               
58 Eliott C. McLaughlin, War on Campus: The Escalating Battle 
Over College Free Speech, CNN (May 1, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/campus-free-speech-trnd/. 
59 Id.  
60 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE 
FOURTH, act 5, sc. 4. 
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stronger with each iteration.”61 And yet, the Middle 
Majority feels helpless to stop, or even slow down, this 
bullet train of bitterness. 
 The Middle Majority does, however, hold the keys 
to reversing this descent into hostility and hyperbole. 
One answer, as is often the case in a capitalist society, 
lies in our wallets. We can choose to weaken the impact 
of extremism by refusing to buy that person’s book, or 
subscribe to that magazine, or watch that television 
program. We can refuse to click on that story, and, more 
importantly, ignore the link to that advertiser’s website. 
Companies take notice when clicks, sales, and ratings 
fall. It is high time we reacted to extremists in a way that 
relegates them to the shadows from whence they came. 
While I will support that person’s constitutional right to 
speak, I also believe in our right to react to that speech 
in a way that minimizes its impact on society and opens 
the door for more thoughtful, well-reasoned, civil 
discourse. For those who seek a more proactive approach, 
remember that advertisers crave your dollars. The 
marketplace compels companies to react in a way that 
maximizes profit. If enough people register disgust with 
that company spokesman, or author, or You-Tuber, 
advertisers will react swiftly to distance themselves from 
the extremism, and the influence of the extremists will 
ebb over time. It is the failure to react that leads to the 
normalization of the extreme. 
 A second key lies in our own access to the public 
forum. The Middle Majority needs to contribute to the 
debate as often as possible in a way that rejects 
extremism and replaces it with logic and calm, articulate 
reasoning. It is not a sign of weakness to acknowledge 
valid points made by those who oppose your view. It 
furthers the public interest to seek common ground and 
offer suggestions that move the country forward, as 
                                               
61 Peggy Noonan, Rage is All the Rage, and It’s Dangerous, 
WALL ST. J., June 17-18, 2017, at A13.  
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opposed to the ongoing stalemate left in the wake of 
dogmatic extremism. Compromise is not a four-letter 
word. As one former president memorably stated, “Let us 
never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to 
negotiate.”62 It is high time we reject extremism of all 
kinds, show respect for various viewpoints through civil 
discourse, and seek common ground for the good of our 
communities, our states, and our nation.  
  
                                               
62 John F. Kennedy, President of the U.S., Inaugural Address 
(Jan. 20, 1961), https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-
Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations/Inaugural-
Address.aspx).  
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Introduction 
 
Complicity is an ancient concept in law and ethics. 
One becomes complicit in the wrongdoing of someone else 
by performing actions that contribute to that 
wrongdoing.1 This principle is found in the teachings of 
many religious faiths,2 and it is embedded throughout the 
American legal system.3 It should be no surprise then 
                                               
1 GREGORY MELLEMA, COMPLICITY AND MORAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2016) (“When someone is complicit in the 
wrongdoing of one or more principal agents, it is by virtue of 
performing a contributing action.”). 
2 See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE pt. II-II, Q. 
62, art. 7 (addressing accomplice liability); JOHN CALVIN, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE GALATIANS 
AND EPHESIANS 310 (William Pringle trans., 1854) (“It is not 
enough that we do not, of our own accord, undertake anything 
wicked. We must beware of joining or assisting those who do 
wrong. In short, we must abstain from giving any consent, or 
advice, or approbation, or assistance; for in all these ways we 
have fellowship.”); CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH pt. 3, 
¶ 1868; NIK MOHAMED AFFANDI BIN NIK YUSOFF, ISLAM & 
BUSINESS 231 (Ismail Noor ed., 2002) (observing that in Islam, 
“whatever is conducive towards what is prohibited is itself 
forbidden”); Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is there 
Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
59, 68 (2013) (noting that “Judaism prohibits even Jewish 
consumers from facilitating a business owner’s violation of 
Jewish law”). 
3 See, e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1245 
(2014) (acknowledging that facilitator liability “reflects a 
centuries-old view of culpability: that a person may be 
responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out if he 
helps another to complete its commission”); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL tit. 9, § 2474 (1998), 
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that complicity also appears in the context of religious 
exemptions from laws of general applicability, in which 
the objector believes his conduct would facilitate 
another’s wrongdoing. Over the past few years, high-
profile religious liberty cases such as Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc.4 and Zubik v. Burwell5 have 
highlighted the role of complicity in Free Exercise Clause 
and Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
jurisprudence. 
Critics of religious exemptions have deployed a 
new argument against accommodations in such cases by 
suggesting that they impose “third-party harm.”6 In 
particular, Professors Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel 
argue that these complicity-based claims are novel and 
that the claims “differ in form and in social logic” from 
other free exercise claims.7 For example, a Muslim 
inmate’s religious objection to shaving his beard does not 
                                               
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-2474-
elements-aiding-and-abetting [https://perma.cc/Z62T-W8CB] 
(“The level of participation [in an unlawful venture] may be of 
relatively slight moment. Also, it does not take much evidence 
to satisfy the facilitation element once the defendant’s 
knowledge of the unlawful purpose is established.” (citations 
omitted)); Matthew Kacsmaryk, Moral Complicity at Court: 
Who Decides?, PUB. DISCOURSE (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.
thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/04/16709/ [https://perma.cc/W6BJ-
SN3X] (“In the modern era, federal, state, and territorial 
governments have enacted myriad statutes, regulations, and 
rules protecting the conscience rights of Americans who 
abstain from practices, procedures, or products that would 
violate their moral duty not to kill or cause harm.”). 
4 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
5 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
6 See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience 
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and 
Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2522 (2015). 
7 Id. at 2519. 
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stem from any complicity with another’s alleged 
wrongdoing.8 Complicity-based claims, they argue, 
impose “material and dignitary harms” on third parties 
that are not adequately accounted for under current 
doctrine.9  
Professors NeJaime and Siegel define material 
harm as “deterring or obstructing access to goods and 
services,”10 such as abortion or same-sex spousal 
benefits.11 Dignitary harms “refer to the social meaning, 
including stigma, which may result from accommodating 
complicity-based objections.”12 This social meaning is 
communicated when religious objectors treat “third 
parties as sinners in ways that can stigmatize and 
demean.”13 Complicity-based claims are particularly 
stigmatizing, they argue, when refusal of services 
“reflects a widely understood message about a contested 
sexual norm.”14 Because of these third-party harms, 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel argue that religious 
accommodations should be diminished or eliminated in 
many complicity cases.15 
This Article argues that the third-party harm 
theory is fundamentally flawed and that complicity-
based religious accommodations are both a traditional 
and necessary part of the American legal framework. 
                                               
8 See id. at 2524 (citing Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015)). 
9 Id. at 2587 (“[O]ne group of citizens should not bear the 
significant costs of another’s claim to religious exercise.”). 
10 Id. at 2566 (“[Material harm] can also occur as objectors 
withhold information that would enable an individual to 
pursue alternative providers.”).  
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 2522. 
13 Id. at 2576. 
14 Id. at 2577. 
15 Id. at 2516 (“At issue is not only whether but how complicity 
claims are accommodated.”). 
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Part I examines Supreme Court precedent in the area of 
free exercise and finds significant support for complicity-
based accommodations. Part II reevaluates the 
magnitude and legitimacy of the asserted third-party 
harms, then weighs the inconveniences imposed on third 
parties against the injuries to religious objectors should 
accommodations be withdrawn. Part III contends that 
culture war conflicts will not be resolved through the 
elimination of religious accommodations in the complicity 
context and proposes a subsidiarity-based alternative to 
imposing coercive legal penalties on religious objectors. 
 
I. Complicity-Based Accommodations Are Not 
Novel 
 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel acknowledge the 
longstanding and “richly elaborated” theory of 
complicity.16 Yet they assert that religious exemptions 
based on complicity were practically unheard of prior to 
Hobby Lobby and are fundamentally different from the 
precedents RFRA invoked as exemplars.17 Historically, 
however, the law has treated complicity-based claims 
with the same regard as other claims for religious 
accommodation. In fact, Hobby Lobby reaffirmed the 
Supreme Court’s long-established solicitude toward 
complicity-related claims. 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,18 Amish parents objected to 
the state’s compulsory secondary schooling requirement 
and sought an exemption for Amish children who had 
completed the eighth grade.19 They condemned the 
“values” promoted by high schools and asserted that 
                                               
16 Id. at 2522–23. 
17 Id. at 2524–29. 
18 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
19 Id. at 207. 
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attendance entangled their families in “a ‘worldly’ 
influence in conflict with their beliefs.”20 By participating 
in the high school system, the Amish feared their 
children would be affected by the corrupting activities 
and influences of third-party students, teachers, and 
administrators.21 Thus, on a plausible reading of Yoder, 
the Amish parents pleaded for precisely the sort of 
complicity-based religious exemption that Professors 
NeJaime and Siegel suggest are novel.22 
Furthermore, accommodation for the Amish 
carried the risk of “third-party harm.” The parents 
implicitly condemned those involved with high schooling 
as being engaged in objectionable conduct. Indeed, it 
might be inferred they believed that those who embraced 
the worldly influences of high school would suffer 
damnation.23 If Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s 
characterization of dignitary harm were to be accepted, 
these aspersions would certainly qualify as “dignitary 
harms.” Even potential material harms were at risk. 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel are correct to observe that 
Yoder “conceptualized the interests of the Amish children 
as aligned with their parents, such that the 
accommodation benefited, rather than potentially 
                                               
20 Id. at 210–11. 
21 Id. at 209 (“They believed that by sending their children to 
high school, they would not only expose themselves to the 
danger of the censure of the church community, but . . . also 
endanger their own salvation and that of their children.”). 
22 See Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise By Moonlight, 53 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 105, 136–37 (2016) (advancing this 
interpretation of Yoder). 
23 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210 (“Old Order Amish communities 
today are characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation 
requires life in a church community separate and apart from 
the world and worldly influence.”). 
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harmed, the children themselves.”24 But the 
accommodation was not limited to such cases, and 
indeed, the extent to which an eighth grader can make 
informed decisions about such matters is questionable. 
The Supreme Court granted the accommodation despite 
the potential material and dignitary harms to third 
parties. 
Another important precedent that Professors 
NeJaime and Siegel gloss over is Thomas v. Review 
Board of Indiana Employment Security Division.25 In 
that case, a Jehovah’s Witness who refused work in a 
tank turret factory was denied unemployment 
compensation.26 Although Professors NeJaime and Siegel 
acknowledge that Thomas involved a complicity-based 
claim for accommodation, they attempt to distinguish it 
from Hobby Lobby by claiming that Thomas did “not 
single out a particular group of citizens as sinning.”27 
This is both inaccurate and irrelevant.28  
First, Thomas did suggest that those who 
manufactured the tank turrets—as well as those who 
would eventually use them to kill—were engaged in 
sinful conduct.29 It was precisely because Thomas 
                                               
24 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2526 (citing Yoder, 406 
U.S. at 209). 
25 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
26 Id. at 709. 
27 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2526 n.45. The Supreme 
Court views Thomas as directly analogous to the complicity-
based claims that Professors NeJaime and Siegel criticize. See 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 
(2014) (calling the issue raised in Thomas “nearly identical” to 
the one raised in Hobby Lobby). 
28 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 137–38. 
29 Thomas had told the hearing referee: “I really could not, you 
know, conscientiously continue to work with armaments. It 
would be against all of the . . . religious principles that . . . I 
have come to learn. . . .” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (alteration in 
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believed the creation of armaments to be sinful that he 
quit his job. By plausible implication, one could infer that 
Thomas believed those who continued to construct 
armaments (or those who would ultimately use them) 
were acting sinfully.  
Second, it is irrelevant because complicity 
analysis should be focused on the objector’s conduct and 
state of mind, not the principal’s conduct and character.30 
Thus, the only relevant point of inquiry is whether 
Thomas’s conduct (assisting the construction of tank 
turrets) violated his religious beliefs, as he understood 
them.31 Thomas’s moral judgments about his fellow 
                                               
original) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. 
Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (1979)). 
30 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 138; see also Marc 
DeGirolami, Three Thoughts on Complicity, Dignity, and 
Religious Accommodation, MIRROR JUST. (July 10, 2015), 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/07/three-
thoughts-on-complicity-dignity-and-religious-accommodation 
[https://perma.cc/RJ8S-GPZ4] (“[T]he conflation of conduct and 
character is a recognizable though deeply regrettable move in 
many of the sorts of disputes implicating these issues.”). 
31 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (“[I]t is not for us to say 
that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. 
Instead, our ‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’ 
whether the line drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’” 
(quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707, 716 (1981)); see also Eugene Volokh, The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act and Complicity in Sin, WASH. POST: 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 30, 2014), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/
30/the-religious-freedom-restoration-act-and-complicity-in-sin/ 
[https://perma.cc/YWL5-6JM5] (observing that precisely 
“[w]here the connection becomes too attenuated and morally or 
religiously culpable complicity stops is a question on which 
reasonable people will differ” in a discussion of Hobby Lobby 
and Thomas). Thus, “when the person believes that complicity 
itself is sinful, the question is not whether our secular legal 
system thinks that he has drawn the right line regarding 
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factory workers and the ultimate users of the tank 
turrets never factor into the analysis. 
Although complicity-based claims are not 
themselves novel, attempting to distinguish complicity 
claims from other religious accommodation claims is 
novel. Presumably, under the third-party harm theory, a 
Hobby Lobby-style case would be resolved differently 
when (A) the objector believes the use of abortion-
inducing drugs is sinful than when (B) the objector 
believes that insurance or drugs are forbidden as a 
general matter (that is, the objection arises without the 
taint of a “sin” claim). This would be a strange result—
one that asks judges to scrutinize the form of the 
objector’s religious reasoning. Not only is this a task that 
judges are unsuited to perform, but it encourages 
religious people to formulate their objections in creative 
ways to avoid complicity. Thus, if the Amish families in 
Yoder formulate their objection in terms of objecting to 
secular education, they will likely win. But if they phrase 
their objection as avoiding complicity with a corrupt 
system of education, they will likely lose. It is more 
reasonable to maintain the current rule that an objector’s 
moral reasoning is irrelevant for exemption purposes.32 
 
II. Balancing Harms: Third Parties v. Religious 
Objectors 
 
                                               
complicity; it is whether he sincerely believes that the 
complicity is sinful.” Id. 
32 Mark L. Rienzi, Unequal Treatment of Religious Exercises 
under RFRA: Explaining the Outliers in the HHS Mandate 
Cases, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 10, 11 (2013) (“Properly 
understood, RFRA’s ‘substantial burden’ analysis examines 
whether the government is coercing a believer to abandon a 
religious exercise . . . . [T]he underlying religious reasons for 
the religious exercise should be entirely irrelevant.”). 
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The third-party harm theory focuses on “material 
and dignitary harms” that those invoking complicity-
based religious objections impose on others. But the 
significance of these harms and the extent to which they 
should be considered in RFRA analysis is questionable. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on third parties obscures or 
ignores the harms that would be imposed on religious 
individuals if the law no longer accommodated their 
beliefs to the extent possible. To accurately evaluate the 
relative social cost of permitting or denying complicity-
based accommodations, both sides of the harm equation 
must be considered. 
This Part will first re-examine, with a critical eye, 
the material and dignitary harms Professors NeJaime 
and Siegel identify. Then, using their framework of third-
party harm, I will weigh the harms imposed on religious 
objectors should RFRA-style accommodations be 
weakened or withdrawn in complicity cases. 
 
A. Harms to Third Parties 
 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel identify a series of 
material and dignitary harms to third parties that they 
believe set complicity-based claims apart from other 
requests for religious accommodation. In this section, the 
scope and magnitude of the alleged harms to third parties 
will be critically re-examined. 
 
1. Material Harms 
 
Material harms include the inability to obtain 
certain healthcare information and services, such as 
abortion, emergency contraception, and assisted 
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reproduction;33 difficulty finding wedding venues and 
vendors for same-sex ceremonies;34 trouble obtaining 
privately-provided social services, such as adoption 
services;35 and denial of spousal insurance coverage or 
other employment benefits to same-sex partners.36 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel worry that complicity-
based refusals in these areas will lead to “an 
unpredictable marketplace” for same-sex couples and 
others seeking sexual and reproductive services.37 
Significant material harms are indeed a relevant 
concern and may be a compelling state interest. 
Nevertheless, there are at least three reasons why 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s characterization of 
these harms is overstated. First, material hardships that 
third parties might face due to religiously motivated 
refusals are already doctrinally accounted for under the 
“compelling state interest” prong of RFRA analysis.38 
                                               
33 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2557–58, 2573. 
34 See id. at 2562–63. 
35 Id. at 2573–74. 
36 See id. at 2563 n.195 and accompanying text. 
37 Id. at 2574. 
38 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 133 (“Compelling state 
interests include third party interests within the statutory 
calculus. Indeed, one might simply say that compelling state 
interests just exactly are third party interests of adequate 
gravity. Whose interests is the government protecting in 
resisting a religious accommodation if not those of third 
parties?”); Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, 
Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 39, 46 (2014) (“The justices said in Cutter that . . . ‘courts 
must take adequate account of the burdens a requested 
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,’ but RFRA, by 
its own terms, appears to require courts to do precisely that.” 
(quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005))); see 
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (“It is basic 
that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some 
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive 
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Professors NeJaime and Siegel acknowledge this when 
they observe the latent concern for third-party harms in 
the Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College v. Burwell39 
decisions.40 If courts considered third-party harm as a 
distinct prong of analysis reserved for complicity cases, 
they would double-count the harms of accommodation 
and effectively give the state “another bite at the apple.”41 
Under existing doctrine, only the most serious material 
harms, “endangering paramount [governmental] 
interests,”42 are factored into RFRA’s compelling state 
interest analysis. This is appropriate because although 
“[m]ost exercises of constitutional rights inflict costs on 
                                               
constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering 
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 530 (1944))) (explaining what constitutes a compelling 
state interest). RFRA ultimately incorporated this 
understanding of compelling governmental interests. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(b). 
39 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014). 
40 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (“That 
consideration [of third party harm] will often inform the 
analysis of the Government’s compelling interest and the 
availability of a less restrictive means of advancing that 
interest.”); NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2530  (“Concern 
about protecting third parties from harm was a structuring 
principle of the Court’s [Hobby Lobby] decision . . . . Justice 
Alito’s majority opinion proceeded on the assumption that the 
government has a compelling interest in ensuring women’s 
‘cost-free access to . . . contraceptive methods.’” (second 
alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779–80 (2014))); see 
also Wheaton, 134 S. Ct. at 2807 (“Nothing in this interim order 
affects the ability of the applicant’s employees and students to 
obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved 
contraceptives.”). 
41 DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 133. 
42 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 
U.S. 516, 530 (1944)). 
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others . . . . not everyone who feels harmed is harmed in 
a legally cognizable way.”43 Depending on the 
circumstance, the mere desire to obtain nonessential 
goods and services may not be a significant material 
harm deserving of judicial consideration. 
Second, market forces are capable of solving most 
cases of material hardship when religious objectors 
decline to provide services.44 Though many business 
owners and organizational directors hold religious 
objections to participation in same-sex marriages or 
providing controversial reproductive services, a greater 
number hold the opposite view.45 Even those who object 
may not be willing to face the legal, social, and economic 
penalties of refusing service.46 In most cases, non-
objecting wedding vendors and pharmacists will be 
available to provide their services, and the alleged 
material harms will be nonexistent.47 Although 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel worry that some 
individuals will be unable to obtain emergency 
contraception or HIV medication,48 extensive fact-finding 
in a pharmacist objection case could not identify a single 
instance of an individual who was unable to obtain 
emergency contraception or HIV drugs as a result of a 
                                               
43 Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active 
Minority Groups: A Response to Professors NeJaime and Siegel, 
125 YALE L.J. F. 369, 379 (2016). 
44 Id. at 379 (“In a market economy, refusals of service rarely 
result in anyone having to do without.”). 
45 See id. 
46 See id. (“Even among those with serious moral objections, 
few are willing to endure the risk of litigation, boycotts, 
defamatory reviews, and vandalism that can follow in the wake 
of refusing service on conscientious grounds.”). 
47 See id. at 379–80 (noting the paucity of complicity-based 
objections and the lack of empirical evidence supporting claims 
of widespread refusals). 
48 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2539–40, 2573. 
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religiously motivated refusal.49 Even “in more 
conservative, religious, and rural parts of the country”50 
where religious objections are likely more common, 
individuals will rarely find themselves without an 
adequate alternative for long.51 
Finally, the law has already established limiting 
principles for instances when inability to obtain essential 
services would inflict serious material harm. Life-
threatening medical emergencies are a prominent 
example. Even though most state medical conscience 
laws do not have emergency exceptions, “federal law 
requires hospitals to treat or stabilize patients in 
emergencies, and that federal mandate overrides all 
contrary state law.”52 It is appropriate for the law to set 
reasonable limitations on the circumstances in which 
religious healthcare providers may refuse to perform 
                                               
49 See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 948 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. 
Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 2433, 2434 (2016) (“[A]fter years of test shopping and 
litigation, Defendants have not identified even one instance 
where a pharmacist refused to fill or referred a patient because 
of a personal, non-conscientious objection. Despite frequent 
mentions of HIV during the rulemaking process, there is no 
evidence that any patient has ever been denied HIV drugs due 
to a conscientious or “personal” objection. . . . Finally, no Board 
witness, or any other witness, was able to identify any 
particular community in Washington—rural or otherwise—
that lacked timely access to emergency contraceptives or any 
other time-sensitive medication.”). 
50 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2574. 
51 Under a Keynesian economic account, demand creates its 
own supply. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Demand Creates Its Own 
Supply, N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Nov. 3, 
2015, 1:23 PM), https://nyti.ms/2q7v1nN. 
52 Laycock, supra note 43, at 381 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1395dd(b)–(c) (2012)). 
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urgent, life-saving procedures.53 In the context of 
abortion, which seems to be Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel’s primary area of concern,54 such circumstances 
may never even arise.55 
 
2. Dignitary Harms 
 
Next, Professors NeJaime and Siegel catalogue 
dignitary harms they believe are not adequately 
accounted for in the RFRA compelling state interest 
analysis. Refusals to provide abortifacients or services for 
a same-sex wedding, for example, communicate “a widely 
understood message about a contested sexual norm.”56 
And accommodating such refusals conveys a “social 
meaning” that stigmatizes lawful conduct.57 These harms 
often have emotional or symbolic effects. 
                                               
53 This may not be the end of the analysis, however. It may be 
preferable to permit religiously objecting hospitals to continue 
to operate according to their beliefs (which inflicts some third-
party harms) rather than force them to close down altogether 
(which would inflict a greater aggregate amount of third-party 
harms). See infra notes 103–06 and accompanying text. 
54 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2566–69. 
55 Experts in obstetrics and gynecology dispute the assertion 
that abortion is ever medically necessary. See COMM. ON 
EXCELLENCE IN MATERNAL HEALTHCARE, DUBLIN 
DECLARATION ON MATERNAL HEALTHCARE (2012), http://
www.dublindeclaration.com/ [https://perma.cc/X75K-MRLJ] 
(declaring that “direct abortion”—the purposeful destruction of 
the unborn child—“is not medically necessary to save the life 
of a woman,” and affirming “a fundamental difference between 
abortion, and necessary medical treatments that are carried 
out to save the life of the mother, even if such treatment results 
in the loss of life of her unborn child.”). 
56 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2577. 
57 Id. at 2522 (“By dignitary harms, we refer to the social 
meaning, including stigma, which may result from 
accommodating complicity-based objections.”). 
97
et al.: V12 I2 (Winter 2018)
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2018
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2 
 
 
[248] 
Despite anecdotal accounts that refusals leave 
some customers feeling hurt or offended,58 it is 
unpersuasive that permitting accommodations actually 
imposes any dignitary harm. There are both practical 
and theoretical difficulties with demonstrating the 
reality of dignitary harms. On a practical level, offenses 
are subjective and difficult to quantify. Does politely and 
respectfully declining to arrange flowers for a same-sex 
wedding communicate an injurious “social meaning” to 
would-be customers?59 Perhaps for some, perhaps not for 
others. Reasonable customers might disagree about 
whether their dignity has been impugned. Would 
different meanings be communicated if an objector said, 
“I would be complicit in your sin” rather than “I would be 
sinning myself”?60 In effect, courts would have to rely on 
the testimony of the third party to determine how much 
harm a refusal inflicted. It would be easy for a politically 
                                               
58 See, e.g., id. at 2575–78.  
59 See Brief for Appellants at 13, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 
389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (No. 91615-2), 2015 WL 12632392 
(“Mr. Ingersoll says that Mrs. Stutzman took his hand and 
explained ‘she could not do the flowers because of her 
relationship with Jesus Christ.’ According to him, she also said, 
‘You know I love you dearly. I think you're a wonderful person 
. . . . But my religion doesn't allow me to do this.’ Mrs. Stutzman 
said all of this in a kind and considerate way.” (alteration in 
original)); Answer at 12, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-
2-00871-5 (Wash. Super. 2015), 2013 WL 10257927 
(“Emotional about her convictions and her decision to decline, 
Barronelle touched Robert’s hand and kindly told him that she 
could not create the floral arrangements for his wedding 
because of her Christian faith. . . . Barronelle and Mr. Ingersoll 
hugged each other, and he left the store.”). 
60 Laycock, supra note 43, at 382; see also supra note 30 and 
accompanying text. 
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influential interest group to define anything it does not 
like as “harmful” to its members’ dignity.61 
On the conceptual level, Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel’s account of dignitary harm assumes that dignity 
is conferred by others or by the government. According to 
their theory, “the state’s authority includes the power to 
confer individual dignity as a self-standing civic good. 
People want to be dignified by the state, their self-worth 
to be accorded official validation, and they perceive state-
countenanced indignities meant for the protection of 
religious freedom as real injuries demanding state 
remediation.”62 But this is a mistaken understanding of 
human dignity that is fundamentally at odds with the 
American tradition. It “rejects the idea—captured in our 
Declaration of Independence—that human dignity is 
innate.”63 If dignity is innate to the human person, rather 
                                               
61 Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
1169, 1171 (2007) (reviewing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE 
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005)) (“We also have 
an expansive capacity to define as harmful anything we don’t 
like. A rule that no religious group could do anything the 
political process defined as harmful would leave all religions at 
the mercy of any interest group that could persuade some 
regulatory body to act.”). 
62 DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 130 (summarizing the theory 
espoused by Professors NeJaime and Siegel). 
63 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2631 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s remarks on the intrinsic 
nature of human dignity are worth including in full: 
 
Human dignity has long been understood 
in this country to be innate. When the Framers 
proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence 
that “all men are created equal” and “endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights,” they referred to a vision of mankind in 
which all humans are created in the image of 
God and therefore of inherent worth. That 
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than conferred by the state, third parties cannot be 
deprived of their dignity through legal accommodations 
for religious objectors.64 
Even if dignitary harms could be proven and 
quantified, it is unclear that the law itself plays any role 
in imposing such harms. As between the religious 
                                               
vision is the foundation upon which this Nation 
was built. 
The corollary of that principle is that 
human dignity cannot be taken away by the 
government. Slaves did not lose their dignity 
(any more than they lost their humanity) 
because the government allowed them to be 
enslaved. Those held in internment camps did 
not lose their dignity because the government 
confined them. And those denied governmental 
benefits certainly do not lose their dignity 
because the government denies them those 
benefits. The government cannot bestow 
dignity, and it cannot take it away. 
The majority's musings are thus deeply 
misguided, but at least those musings can have 
no effect on the dignity of the persons the 
majority demeans. Its mischaracterization of 
the arguments presented by the States and 
their amici can have no effect on the dignity of 
those litigants. Its rejection of laws preserving 
the traditional definition of marriage can have 
no effect on the dignity of the people who voted 
for them. Its invalidation of those laws can 
have no effect on the dignity of the people who 
continue to adhere to the traditional definition 
of marriage. And its disdain for the 
understandings of liberty and dignity upon 
which this Nation was founded can have no 
effect on the dignity of Americans who continue 
to believe in them. 
 
Id. at 2639. 
64 See id. 
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objector and the third party, the law is neutral. It takes 
neither the side of the objector (proscribing the conduct 
the objector views as sinful or requiring everyone 
similarly situated to decline their services) nor the side 
of the customer (forcing all providers to engage in 
objectionable commercial transactions against their 
will).65 It allows both parties the opportunity to order 
their affairs as they see fit. Even if critics of religious 
accommodations are correct to characterize exemptions 
as a privilege of private discrimination,66 it is not obvious 
that the law imposes dignitary harms, or that the 
dignitary harms stemming from private discrimination 
constitute a compelling state interest.67 On the other 
                                               
65 See Sherif Girgis, Nervous Victors, Illiberal Measures: A 
Response to Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. 
F. 399, 403 (2016) (“Legally enforcing a norm against someone 
suggests coercing her to follow it. So Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel are lumping traditionalist-conduct exemptions together 
with legal enforcement of traditionalist views. That seems fair 
only if one assumes that the default is not to accommodate 
these views-so that doing so seems like a gratuitous imposition 
on others. Only then does actually coercing traditionalists to 
violate their consciences seem like the neutral norm.”). 
66 This characterization is contested. See id. (“[C]alling 
exemptions a ‘special advantage’ is tendentious. It assumes 
that the default in a constitutional democracy is not to protect 
conscience claims that might make a political splash. Only 
then does protecting them anyway seem like favoritism.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
67 The only free exercise case finding a compelling state interest 
in eliminating private discrimination was Bob Jones University 
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). See Alex Reed, 
RFRA v. ENDA: Religious Freedom and Employment 
Discrimination, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 2, 38 (2016). In Bob 
Jones, the state interest in promoting racial equality in 
education, expressed by all three branches of the federal 
government over the course of several decades, outweighed the 
religious claimant’s interest in free exercise. See 461 U.S. at 
604. Racial discrimination in education results in both 
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hand, if courts adopted the dignitary harm theory, it 
could become a self-fulfilling prophesy: the more that 
courts “say that a policy or belief expresses disdain for a 
group, the more it will take on that social meaning.”68 
Even if the law imposed a dignitary harm, this 
harm is non-unique and cannot be considered by courts. 
The First Amendment permits speech and other forms of 
expression that impose dignitary harms all the time. 
What makes dignitary harm a trump card for free 
exercise, but not for other First Amendment liberties, 
such as free speech or freedom of the press? Because 
dignitary harms “are expressive harms, based on the 
‘communicative impact’ of the religious practice,”69 they 
                                               
material and dignitary harms under Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel’s rubric. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe the 
Court’s judgment was limited in scope and not generally 
applicable to issues of sexual mores with which Professors 
NeJaime and Siegel are concerned. See Girgis, supra note 65, 
at 411. See generally Johnny Rex Buckles, The Sexual Integrity 
of Religious Schools and Tax Exemption, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 255 (2017). 
68 See Girgis, supra note 65, at 404. Professor Richard Epstein 
expresses a similar concern that countenancing such harms-
without-legal-injury would make “virtually all human conduct 
. . . actionable.” Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for the 
First Amendment, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25 (2018). He 
continues: 
 
To protect individuals against mere offensive 
conduct is to invite people to merit that exalted 
status by getting angrier and angrier, so that 
their private resentments give strong claims of 
rights against one another. Everyone can play 
this game so that mutual indignation becomes 
the source of great anxiety or worse. 
 
Id. 
69 Laycock, supra note 43, at 376. 
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are precisely the sorts of harms that the government is 
normally disallowed from considering as a legitimate 
state interest.70 First Amendment jurisprudence is 
replete with instances of protected speech that impose 
dignitary harm on third parties: parade organizers may 
exclude disfavored groups,71 proselytizers may insult 
their listeners’ most cherished beliefs,72 private 
expressive associations may discriminate against 
members based on their sexual conduct,73 and protesters 
                                               
70 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The 
government generally has a freer hand in restricting 
expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or 
spoken word. It may not, however, proscribe particular conduct 
because it has expressive elements.” (citations omitted)); 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring 
the state interest in regulating conduct be “unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression”); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. 
Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (8-0 decision) (finding that the 
government cannot refuse to register a trademark on the 
grounds that “it expresses ideas that offend”). 
71 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of 
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 578–79 (1995) (9-0 decision) (ruling that 
the state’s interest in nondiscrimination could not be invoked 
to require a private parade organizer to modify its expressive 
conduct by including an LGBT group) (“The very idea that a 
noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts 
and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all 
people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to 
nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of 
orthodox expression.”). 
72 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) 
(affirming the right of a Jehovah’s Witness to play a 
phonograph record that “attacked the [Catholic] religion and 
church” and “incensed” listeners). 
73 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–61 (2000); 
see also Laycock, supra note 43, at 377 (observing that “Dale 
had been an active and engaged scout for twelve years; the 
dignitary harm of being excluded from scouting at that point 
must have been vastly greater than the typical dignitary harm 
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may express even the most vulgar and offensive slogans 
at their audience’s most vulnerable moments.74 The effect 
of such speech on third parties is legally irrelevant.75 
That some third parties will find religiously motivated 
refusals to be upsetting, offensive, or disagreeable is no 
doubt true. But the resulting emotional or symbolic 
injuries are simply not a matter of judicial concern. 
It is inconsistent with First Amendment doctrine 
and norms to assert that religious refusals that either 
explicitly or implicitly “reflect[] and reiterate[] a familiar 
message about contested sexual norms”76 deserve less 
protection because of the viewpoint expressed by that 
                                               
of being refused a one-time arms-length transaction” but that 
“no Justice found a compelling interest in preventing [that] 
harm”). 
74 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011) (8-1 decision) 
(upholding protection of slogans such as “‘God Hates the 
USA/Thank God for 9/11,’ ‘America is Doomed,’ ‘Don't Pray for 
the USA,’ ‘Thank God for IEDs,’ ‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers,’ 
‘Pope in Hell,’ ‘Priests Rape Boys,’ ‘God Hates Fags,’ ‘You're 
Going to Hell,’ and ‘God Hates You’” displayed at a soldier’s 
Catholic funeral). 
75 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (“We have said time and again 
that ‘the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited 
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of 
their hearers.’” (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 
(1969))); Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (“Such speech cannot be 
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”); 
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 (“[T]he point of all speech protection . . . 
is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes 
are misguided, or even hurtful.”); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (“If 
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, 
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”). 
76 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2576. 
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refusal.77 This impermissibly singles out religious 
speakers who affirm traditional sexual moral norms for 
disfavored status. The viewpoint-neutrality violation 
here is even more egregious because it specially targets 
religious groups because those groups are politically 
engaged in culture-wide disputes about the morality of 
abortion and same-sex marriage.78 Professors NeJaime 
                                               
77 See supra note 69; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“When the 
government targets not subject matter, but particular views 
taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First 
Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination 
is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the 
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the 
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” (citation omitted)); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (“We 
have long held, for example, that nonverbal expressive activity 
can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because 
of the ideas it expresses . . . .”). 
78 Professors NeJaime and Siegel place significant emphasis on 
the fact that many religious objectors to same-sex marriage 
and abortion are engaged in a broader politically active 
community. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2542–45 
(noting with concern that “complicity-based conscience claims 
are asserted in society-wide conflicts by mobilized groups and 
individuals acting in coalitions that reach across religious 
denominational lines”). They assert that dignitary harms are 
especially pernicious when such “a mass movement amplifies 
[the refusal’s] power to demean.” Id. at 2578. In other words, 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel contend, “Because these 
conscientious objectors engage in a political argument, they 
lose their right to conscientious objection.” See Laycock, supra 
note 43, at 371 (summarizing their view); see also Girgis, supra 
note 65, at 402 (“The implication is clear: Officials should 
discount claims when granting them might empower believers 
to push for their views, or even change laws they oppose.”). 
This is preposterous. It also betrays a desperation to “lock-
in” the newly prevailing cultural orthodoxy on contested moral 
issues. As Laycock put it: “Religious conservatives are 
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and Siegel would likely have little objection to an 
“Orthodox Jew with a wholesale grocery business [who] 
refuses to stock or sell nonkosher items” in violation of 
local ordinances because “he does not want to tempt or 
assist any other Jew to consume the nonkosher items.”79 
Even though this is a complicity-based objection, it does 
not implicate a “national political battle over nonkosher 
food” and Professors NeJaime and Siegel would likely not 
be concerned about the “social meanings” the shopkeeper 
communicates to customers who are “harmed or 
inconvenienced.”80 Their argument depends (at least in 
part) on the socio-political context of religious 
accommodations, which is currently concentrated on 
conflicts with the sexual revolution. 
Religious actors are free to express tenets of their 
faith that either explicitly or implicitly tell non-members 
that they are sinning or will suffer damnation.81 Yet the 
                                               
constitutionally entitled to argue for their views on the 
regulation of sex . . . . And their exercise of that right is not a 
ground for forfeiting other rights they may have, including 
their right to religious exemptions. . . . Religious conservatives 
do not forfeit their right to conscientious objection by making 
political arguments about the laws they object to, and they do 
not forfeit their right to make political arguments by invoking 
their right to conscientious objection.” Laycock, supra note 43, 
at 371–72.  
79 Laycock, supra note 43, at 382. 
80 Id. Laycock observes that this hypothetical also 
demonstrates that “[c]omplicity is irrelevant to Professors 
NeJaime and Siegel’s argument—unless they mean for readers 
to assume that complicity claims are a lesser kind of claim, less 
deserving of protection.” Id. at 382–83. 
81 See Girgis, supra note 65, at 406 (“Religious freedom includes 
nothing if not the rights to worship, proselytize, and convert—
forms of conduct (and speech) that can express the conviction 
that outsiders are wrong. Perhaps not just wrong, but deluded 
about matters of cosmic importance around which they have 
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law does not prohibit these more straightforward sources 
of dignitary injury. It would be perverse to contend that 
directly saying, “You are a murderer!”82 is protected 
speech, but that the speaker should be penalized for 
indirectly communicating that same “social meaning” 
through her refusal of services.83 The notion that 
religious accommodations should be curtailed to shelter 
third parties from messages about sin they do not like is 
truly remarkable for its audacity. 
 
B. Harms to Religious Objectors 
 
There is serious reason to doubt the model of 
third-party harm that Professors NeJaime and Siegel 
propose. But assuming material and dignitary harms 
should be considered in complicity cases, how should 
courts evaluate the harms to third parties as compared 
to the harms to the religious objectors themselves? To 
gather a sense of the true social cost of accommodation 
versus non-accommodation, the potential material and 
dignitary harms imposed on religious objectors must also 
be considered. 
If complicity-based accommodations were to be 
significantly weakened or withdrawn, it is improbable 
that sincere religious objectors would continue to engage 
in business that makes them complicit with what they 
                                               
ordered their lives—even damnably wrong.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
82 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2576. 
83 See id. at 2586 (“Are there ways to accommodate religious 
persons without giving legal sanction to their view that other 
law-abiding citizens are sinning? If the government grants an 
accommodation, is the accommodation structured to block or 
amplify dissemination of religious claims about the sins of 
other citizens?”). 
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believe to be sinful.84 In the long run, sincere religious 
objectors might leave an entire industry altogether. In 
the short term, religious objectors will be subjected to 
catastrophic fines and penalties, as has been the case 
when RFRA-style protections are unavailing. As will be 
seen, the material and dignitary harms imposed on 
religious objectors would be significant, both in scope and 
magnitude, if RFRA accommodations were diminished or 
eliminated in complicity cases. 
 
1. Material Harms 
 
When RFRA protections are unavailable or 
denied, religious objectors commonly face grave 
consequences for refusing to provide goods or services in 
situations they believe would make them complicit with 
                                               
84 Cases are plentiful in which religious objectors choose to 
close their businesses rather than operate in a manner 
contrary to their convictions. See infra notes 85–97 and 
accompanying text; see also Epstein, supra note 68, at 36 (“The 
religious organizations only ask that people, for a limited 
subset of services, go down the block to another business that 
is happy to serve them. The human rights proponents ask 
people to give up their religious beliefs or go out of business 
entirely.”). 
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sin. Florists,85 bakers,86 wedding photographers,87 and 
other artistic professionals88 who object to participating 
                                               
85 See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 
2017). Baronelle Stuzmann, the elderly owner of Arlene’s 
Flowers in Richland, Washington, declined to provide wedding 
flower arrangements for a longtime customer’s same-sex 
wedding. Id. at 549. As a result, Stuzmann was found 
personally liable for violating Washington’s law against 
discrimination and Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 550. The 
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the judgment ordering 
Stuzmann to pay monetary damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 
Id. at 568. In a media statement, Stuzmann’s lawyers alleged 
that the judgment threatens “not only her business, but also 
her family’s savings, retirement funds, and home.” Washington 
Floral Artist to Ask US Supreme Court to Protect Her Freedom, 
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Feb. 16, 2017), 
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/8608 [https://perma.cc/
4ZLB-N7XP]. 
Although the State of Washington has a religious freedom 
clause in its constitution, it has no RFRA statute. WASH. 
CONST., art. I, § 11; see Hunter Schwarz, 19 States that have 
‘Religious Freedom’ Laws Like Indiana’s that No One is 
Boycotting, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/03/27/19-states-that-
have-religious-freedom-laws-like-indianas-that-no-one-is-
boycotting/ [https://perma.cc/QKP6-XHQL]. 
86 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 
(Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied, No. 15SC738, 2016 WL 1645027 
(Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 
(2017). A same-sex couple brought complaint against the 
proprietor of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips, for violating 
Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) when he declined 
to bake a cake for their wedding ceremony. Id. at 277. Phillips 
was found guilty and ordered to re-educate his staff and amend 
his company policies to comply with CADA to avoid financial 
penalties. Id. Masterpiece Cakeshop no longer offers wedding 
cakes. See Bakery Will Stop Making Wedding Cakes After 
Losing Discrimination Case, CBS DENVER (May 30, 2014), 
http://denver.cbslocal.com/2014/05/30/bakery-will-stop-making-
wedding-cakes-after-losing-discrimination-case/ 
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in same-sex ceremonies frequently face catastrophic fines 
and even potential jail time, which threatens their 
livelihoods and well-being. Owners of small bed-and-
                                               
[https://perma.cc/7423-AFXE]. Although the State of Colorado 
has a religious freedom clause in its constitution, it has no 
RFRA statute. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4; Schwarz, supra 
note 85. 
For the case of Sweet Cakes by Melissa, see infra notes 94–
98 and accompanying text. 
87 See, e.g., Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 
(N.M. App. 2012). When Jonathan and Elaine Huguenin, the 
owners of Elane Photography, declined to photograph Vanessa 
Willock’s same-sex commitment ceremony, Willock filed a 
complaint with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission. 
Id. at 433. An administrative hearing found Elane 
Photography guilty of violating the New Mexico Human Rights 
Act and awarded $6,637.94 in attorneys’ fees to Willock. See id. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013). In 
a separate concurrence, Justice Bosson wrote that although the 
Huguenins “now are compelled by law to compromise the very 
religious beliefs that inspire their lives,” this sacrifice “is the 
price of citizenship.” Id. at 79, 80 (Bosson, J., concurring). 
88 Joanna Duka and Breanna Koski, the owners of a Phoenix-
based art studio that specializes in lettering and calligraphy 
for wedding invitations, have appealed the denial of a pre-
enforcement challenge against a local ordinance that requires 
them to provide services to same-sex weddings and prevents 
them from communicating their faith-based reasons for 
celebrating marriages between one man and one woman. See 
Brief for Appellant at 1–2, Brush & Nib Studio v. City of 
Phoenix, No. CV2016-052251, 2017 WL 1113222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
Mar. 8, 2017). Violation of the ordinance carries penalties of up 
to $2,500 in fines and six months in jail. See PHX., ARIZ., CODE 
§§ 1-5, 18-4, 18-7 (2010); see also Artists to Appeals Court: Halt 
Phoenix Ordinance that Punishes Artistic Freedom with Jail 
Time, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Mar. 9, 2017), 
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/10037 
[https://perma.cc/T9VE-J8HB]. 
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breakfast establishments89 and wedding venue 
providers90 are often subjected to the same fate. 
                                               
89 See, e.g., Will Brumleve, B&B Ordered to Pay Damages to 
Same-Sex Couple, Stop Discriminating, FORD CTY. REC. (Mar. 
29, 2016), http://www.paxtonrecord.net/news/courts-police-
and-fire/2016-03-29/bb-ordered-pay-damages-same-sex-
couple-stop-discriminating [https://perma.cc/T9VE-J8HB]. Jim 
and Beth Walder, who own TimberCreek Bed & Breakfast in 
Illinois, face large fines for refusing to rent their facility for a 
same-sex wedding ceremony. Id. 
In 2016, an administrative law judge ordered the Walders 
to pay a total of $80,000 in “emotional distress” damages and 
attorneys’ fees for making a same-sex couple feel “embarrassed 
and humiliated.” Id. The judge even “ordered the B&B to offer 
the Wathens access to the facility, within one year, for an event 
celebrating their civil union.” Id. The judgment is being 
appealed. See Will Brumleve, B&B Owner Taking Appeal to 
Court, Foregoing IHRC Hearing, FORD CTY. REC. (Dec. 26, 
2016), http://www.paxtonrecord.net/news/courts-police-and-
fire/2016-12-26/bb-owner-taking-appeal-court-foregoing-ihrc-
hearing [https://perma.cc/V4GL-WF6H].  
90 See, e.g., Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n Of The United 
Methodist Church v. Papaleo, No. CIV.A.07-3802 (JAP), 2007 
WL 3349787 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007), aff’d in part and remanded 
sub nom. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United 
Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 F. App’x 232 (3d Cir. 
2009). New Jersey’s Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association 
was ordered to offer their pavilion as a wedding venue for 
same-sex couples under the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination. Id. at *2. Immediately thereafter, the 
Association shuttered its wedding venue service. See MaryAnn 
Spoto, State Sides with Lesbian Couple in Fight against Ocean 
Grove Association, NJ.COM (Dec. 30, 2008), http://www.nj.com/ 
news/index.ssf/2008/12/judge_rules_monmouth_church_gr.html 
[https://perma.cc/774T-ESGL] (noting that the parachurch 
organization no longer permits wedding ceremonies on its 
property). 
In 2011, a lesbian couple successfully sued the Catholic 
owners of the Wildflower Inn in Vermont for declining to host 
their same-sex reception. See Katie Zezima, Couple Sues a 
Vermont Inn for Rejecting Gay Wedding, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 
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Pharmacists and other health care professionals who 
decline to provide birth control they believe to be 
abortifacient can also be confronted with hefty 
penalties.91 Both for-profit and non-profit organizations 
                                               
2011), https://nyti.ms/2psU7iK. As punishment, the owners 
had to pay $10,000 in civil fines to the Vermont Human Rights 
Commission and put $20,000 in a charitable trust for the 
lesbian couple. See Katie J.M. Baker, ‘Family Friendly’ Inn 
Decides it Would Rather Stop Hosting Wedding Receptions 
Altogether Than Cater to Lesbian Couple, JEZEBEL (Aug. 24, 
2012), http://jezebel.com/5937548/family-friendly-inn-decides-
it-would-rather-stop-hosting-weddings-altogether-than-cater-
to-lesbian-couple [https://perma.cc/XS8D-RZEZ]. Jim and 
Mary O’Reilly no longer host wedding receptions on their 
property. Id. 
Robert and Cynthia Gifford, the residents of a New York 
farm that also serves as a wedding venue, were fined $13,000 
in a similar case in 2014. See Kirsten Andersen, Catholic 
Couple Fined $13,000 for Refusing to Host Same-Sex ‘Wedding’ 
at Their Farm, LIFESITENEWS (Aug. 20, 2014), 
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/catholic-couple-fined-13000-
for-refusing-to-host-same-sex-wedding-at-their [https:// perma.cc/ 
F9SL-D89F]. The Giffords ultimately decided not to appeal the 
ruling and have stopped using the farm for wedding 
ceremonies. See Valerie Richardson, New York Farm Owners 
Give up Legal Fight after Being Fined $13,000 for Refusing to 
Host Gay Wedding, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/23/robert-
cynthia-giffords-give-legal-fight-over-same/ [https://perma.cc/
F9SL-D89F].  
91 See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016). In 2007, the 
Washington State Pharmacy Board passed regulations 
eliminating conscience-based referrals and requiring 
pharmacies to carry “morning-after pills” Plan B and ella. Id. 
at 1072. Failure to comply with the regulations may result in 
“discipline or other enforcement actions.” WASH. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 246-869-010 (2007). The Storman family, which owns Ralph’s 
Thriftway pharmacy, and two pharmacists objected to the 
regulations because of their belief that “dispensing these drugs 
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may suffer when complicity-based religious objections 
are not respected.92 Perhaps most radically of all, 
                                               
‘constitutes direct participation in the destruction of human 
life.’” Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1073 n.3. The trial court found that 
the State’s regulations were designed to target religious health 
care providers. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 
987 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. 
Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). Nevertheless, the 
Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ claims and held that the 
regulations did “not infringe a fundamental right.” Stormans, 
794 F.3d 1064. at 1088.  
Over the objection of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Alito and Thomas, the Supreme Court denied review. 
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016). Justice 
Alito observed that Washington’s regulations “are likely to 
make a pharmacist unemployable if he or she objects on 
religious grounds to dispensing certain prescription 
medications.” Id. at 2433 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). Anticipating the effect of the regulations, he 
suggested that Washington “would rather have no pharmacy 
than one that doesn’t toe the line on abortifacient emergency 
contraceptives.” Id. at 2440. Marveling at the policy’s “hostility 
toward religious objections” and the Court’s failure to review 
the case, Justice Alito warned, “If this is a sign of how religious 
liberty claims will be treated in the years ahead, those who 
value religious freedom have cause for great concern.” Id. at 
2433.  
92 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2775–76 (2014). Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood, and Mardel 
faced crippling fines for non-compliance with the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations about 
contraceptive provision. The Court detailed the various costs of 
non-compliance for Hobby Lobby: 
 
If the Hahns and Greens and their companies 
do not yield to this demand, the economic 
consequences will be severe. If the companies 
continue to offer group health plans that do not 
cover the contraceptives at issue, they will be 
taxed $100 per day for each affected individual. 
For Hobby Lobby, the bill could amount to $1.3 
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Professors NeJaime and Siegel suggest that religious 
leaders—including priests, pastors, imams, and rabbis—
                                               
million per day or about $475 million per year; 
for Conestoga, the assessment could be $90,000 
per day or $33 million per year; and for Mardel, 
it could be $40,000 per day or about $15 million 
per year. These sums are surely substantial. 
 
Id. at 2275–76 (citation omitted). In addition to these for-profit 
examples, consider the non-profit petitioners in Zubik v. 
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (per curiam). The Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Pittsburgh, Priests for Life, the Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Washington, East Texas Baptist 
University, the Little Sisters of the Poor, Southern Nazarene 
University, and Geneva College were among the organizations 
that challenged the Department’s contraceptive mandate on 
RFRA grounds. Id. Organizations that fail to comply with the 
contraceptive mandate or obtain an exemption would be 
subject to a daily fine of $100 per employee. See Sarah Torre, 
Religious Liberty at the Supreme Court: Little Sisters of the 
Poor Take on Obamacare Mandate, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 
22, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/religious-liberty/report/
religious-liberty-the-supreme-court-little-sisters-the-poor-take
-obamacare [https://perma.cc/M5V7-U9ZA].  
If unable to obtain an exemption, the Little Sisters of the 
Poor could be fined “up to $70 million a year” for 
noncompliance. Id. Catholic Charities in Pittsburgh, which has 
a total operating budget of $10 million, would face between “$2 
million to $4 million a year” in federal fines. See Brian Bowling, 
Bishops Zubik, Persico Say They Can’t Cooperate with Health 
Care Mandate, TRIBLIVE (Nov. 12, 2013), http://triblive.com/ 
news/adminpage/5054656-74/mandate-catholic-coverage [https:// 
perma.cc/8ZVB-XYG4]. California’s tiny Thomas Aquinas 
College “faces fines of up to $2.8 million a year if it does not 
comply with the mandate.” Kurt Jensen, Ultimate Relief from 
Mandate May Lie Beyond the Courts, Say Plaintiffs, CATH. 
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.catholicnews.com/ 
services/englishnews/2016/ultimate-relief-from-mandate-may-lie-
beyond-the-courts-say-plaintiffs [https://perma.cc/8ZVB-XYG4]. 
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should have no choice but to solemnize same-sex 
ceremonies.93 
Among the many penalties imposed on religious 
objectors in complicity cases, one particularly draconian 
instance stands out: In 2013, Aaron and Melissa Klein, 
the proprietors of a small Oregon bakery called Sweet 
Cakes by Melissa, declined to bake a cake for a same-sex 
wedding ceremony.94 When the same-sex couple filed a 
complaint, Oregon Labor Commissioner Brad Avakian 
ordered the Kleins to pay $135,000 in damages to 
compensate the couple for “emotional, mental and 
physical suffering” related to the refusal.95 Although the 
judgment is still being appealed, the massive penalty and 
their vulnerability to future litigation forced the Kleins 
to close their bakery in October 2016.96 “We lost our 
business,” Melissa Klein said.97 “You work so hard to 
build something up, and something you’ve poured your 
                                               
93 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2561 (“Many states 
that allow same-sex couples to marry have enacted legislation 
making clear that religious denominations and clergy have no 
obligation to solemnize a same-sex marriage.”); cf. Complaint 
at 2, Knapp v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (D. 
Idaho 2016) (No. 2:14-CV-00441-REB) (describing the plight of 
Christian ministers at a wedding chapel who faced up to 180 
days in jail and up to $1,000 in fines for each day they refused 
to perform same-sex ceremonies in violation of a local 
nondiscrimination ordinance). 
94 See In re Melissa Elaine Klein, Nos. 44-14, 45-14, 2015 WL 
4868796, at *3 (OR BOLI July 2, 2015). 
95 Id. at *23. 
96 See Casey Parks, Sweet Cakes by Melissa, Bakery that 
Turned Away Lesbians, Closes, OREGONIAN (Oct. 6, 2016), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2016/10/sweet_
cakes_by_melissa_bakery.html [https://perma.cc/R7TV-543Y]. 
97 Id. 
115
et al.: V12 I2 (Winter 2018)
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2018
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2 
 
 
[266] 
heart into and was your passion, to lose that has been 
devastating for me.”98 
These heavy-handed fines and penalties 
ultimately drive religious objectors out of their chosen 
service, trade, or industry. In addition to the economic 
harms imposed on the objectors themselves, the vacuum 
created imposes material harms on third parties—
particularly foster children, victims of human trafficking, 
the elderly poor, and all those who depend on religious 
hospitals and healthcare providers. The withdrawal of 
faith-based adoption services from states where “anti-
discrimination” legislation would force organizations like 
Catholic Charities to place children with adoptive same-
sex couples,99 for instance, has left a gaping vacuum that 
harms thousands of children who languish in the foster 
care system.100 A member of the U.S. Commission on 
                                               
98 Id. 
99 See Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Say Rules on Gay Parents 
Limit Freedom of Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2011), 
https://nyti.ms/2n7lwCY (noting Catholic Charities’ 
withdrawal of adoption services from Massachusetts, Illinois, 
and Washington, D.C.). 
100 See Ryan Anderson & Sarah Torre, Adoption, Foster Care, 
and Conscience Protection, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://www.heritage.org/marriage-and-family/report/adoption-
foster-care-and-conscience-protection [https://perma.cc/R3VU-
FJTD]. 
In the two decades before Catholic Charities of Boston 
ended its adoption program, it helped place at least 720 
children in permanent adoptive homes. See Archdiocese of 
Boston, Catholic Charities of Boston To Discontinue Adoption 
Services (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.bostoncatholic.org/
uploadedFiles/News_releases_2006_statement060310-1.pdf; 
see also U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Discrimination 
Against Catholic Adoption Services (2016), http://www.usccb
.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/Adoption-
Services-Fact-Sheet-2016.pdf (“Catholic Charities of Boston, 
which had been one of the nation’s oldest adoption agencies, 
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Civil Rights observed with concern in 2016: “It is 
possible, perhaps even probable, that in the near future 
there will be no orthodox Christian organizations 
partnering with the government to provide adoption and 
foster care services in the United States.”101 
Forcing religious-affiliated organizations, such as 
Christian colleges, to provide health insurance plans that 
include allegedly abortifacient forms of birth control led 
some institutions to end health insurance coverage for 
their students and employees altogether.102 If forced to 
                                               
faced a very difficult choice: violate its conscience, or close its 
doors.”). 
In 2011, Illinois passed civil union legislation that, in 
conjunction with an existing “anti-discrimination” law, 
required faith-based foster care and adoption service providers 
to place children with cohabiting and same-sex couples. See 
Manya A. Brachear, 3 Dioceses Drop Foster Care Lawsuit, CHI. 
TRIB. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-
11-15/news/ct-met-catholic-charities-foster-care-20111115_1_ 
civil-unions-act-catholic-charities-religious-freedom-protection. 
As a result, Catholic Charities, the Evangelical Child and 
Family Agency, and other faith-based adoption service 
providers had to drop the adoption services of more than 2,000 
children. See Anderson & Torre, supra. Even when these 
children’s cases are transferred to other agencies, the 
ostracism of conscientious faith-based providers burdens the 
foster care system. Id. 
101 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: 
RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 61 (2016) (statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow). 
102 See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 793 (7th Cir. 
2015). When the Seventh Circuit refused to issue a preliminary 
injunction against the contraceptive mandate, Wheaton 
College chose to drop its health insurance plan altogether 
rather than violate its religious principles or pay substantial 
fines. See Manya Brachear Pashman, Wheaton College Ends 
Coverage amid Fight Against Birth Control Mandate, CHI. 
TRIB. (July 29, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ 
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choose between their charitable work and their religious 
beliefs, the Little Sisters of the Poor would be compelled 
to stop serving the 13,000 elderly poor they care for on a 
regular basis.103 
Likewise, victims of human trafficking are 
harmed when religious groups’ anti-trafficking work is 
defunded simply because those groups do not provide or 
refer for abortion, contraception, or sterilization 
services.104 The failure to respect faith-based providers’ 
                                               
breaking/ct-wheaton-college-ends-student-insurance-met-
20150728-story [https://perma.cc/6ZGB-EUYQ]. 
103 See Who Are the Little Sisters of the Poor?, THE LITTLE 
SISTERS OF THE POOR, http://thelittlesistersofthepoor.com/who-
are-the-little-sisters-of-the-poor-1/#who-are-the-little-sisters-
of-the-poor [https://perma.cc/Y5L7-XLS8] (last visited Dec. 20, 
2017) (“The Little Sisters serve more than 13,000 elderly poor 
in 31 countries around the world. The first home opened in 
America in 1868 and now there are nearly 30 homes in the U.S. 
where the elderly and dying are cared for with love and dignity 
until God calls them home.”); see also Loraine Maguire, 
Obamacare Attacks Religious Liberty: Little Sisters Mother 
Provincial, USA TODAY (Mar. 22, 2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/03/22/little-sisters-
poor-obamacare-hhs-mandate-supreme-court-religious-liberty-
column/82076170/ [https://perma.cc/BKS3-ES3Q] (“Most of the 
people who live in my residence have nowhere else to go.”). 
104 See Chris Boyette, Federal Program Denies Grant to 
Catholic Group to Help Sex Trafficking Victims, CNN (Dec. 6, 
2011), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/06/federal-program
-denies-grant-to-catholic-group-to-help-sex-trafficking-victims/ 
(reporting on the defunding of the United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops’ Migrant and Refugee Service). The offending 
language in the USCCB’s contract read: 
 
As we are a Catholic organization, we need 
to ensure that our victims services funds are 
not used to refer or fund activities that would 
be contrary to our moral convictions and 
religious beliefs. . . . Specifically, 
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complicity-based objections to participating in such 
services ultimately harms “thousands of victims” of 
human trafficking.105 
Finally, if the Church Amendment and other so-
called “healthcare refusal” laws—which protect the 
conscience rights of health care providers to refuse to 
perform or assist with abortions—are withdrawn or 
diminished as Professors NeJaime and Siegel propose,106 
many faith-based hospitals and physicians would exit the 
healthcare industry rather than violate their beliefs. This 
would represent a massive disruption of American 
healthcare delivery since “one in six patients in the 
United States is treated by a Catholic hospital”107 and 
                                               
subcontractors could not provide or refer for 
abortion services or contraceptive materials for 
our clients pursuant to this contract. 
 
KEVIN BALES & RON SOODALTER, THE SLAVE NEXT DOOR 229 
(1st ed. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting the terms of the 
contract). Representative Chris Smith, the author of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, remarked, “If you 
are a Catholic, or other faith-based [non-governmental 
organization], or a secular organization of conscience, there is 
now clear proof that your grant application will not be 
considered under a fair, impartial and totally transparent 
process . . . .” See Boyette, supra. 
105 See Boyette, supra note 104; see also Pete Winn, HHS 
Withholds Grant from U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops 
Apparently Because Church Opposes Abortion, CATH. NEWS 
SERV. (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/
article/hhs-withholds-grant-us-conference-catholic-bishops-
apparently-because-church-opposes (noting that federal grants 
to the USCCB’s Migrant and Relief Services had helped “more 
than 2,700 victims” of human trafficking). 
106 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2566. 
107 Id. at 2556–57 (citing Catholic Health Care in the United 
States, CATH. HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S. 1 (Jan. 2014), 
https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/general-files/
cha_miniprofile_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3WL-Z4SA]). 
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“[r]eligious hospitals represent nearly a fifth of the 
healthcare delivery system in the United States.”108 The 
extent to which Professors NeJaime and Siegel 
successfully demonstrate the United States’ dependence 
on faith-based healthcare is exactly the extent to which 
they reveal the devastation that would result if Catholic 
and other religious healthcare providers were forced to 
close their doors. Millions of Americans would experience 
reduced access and greater difficulty in obtaining life-
saving treatment and other medical services.109 
 
2. Dignitary Harms 
 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel assert that 
providing exemptions for complicity-based claims “has 
potential to harm those whom the claimants view as 
sinning.”110 But requiring religious actors to either 
violate their beliefs or close their businesses imposes 
dignitary harms on those religious objectors. Unlike the 
existing legal regime—which offers latitude for both 
individuals seeking services and religious objectors to 
live in accordance with their beliefs—weakening RFRA 
protections would marginalize religious dissenters’ views 
                                               
108 Id. at 2557 (citing Jennifer Harper, Doctors Face Religious 
Conflicts at Hospitals, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/14/doctors-
report-religious-conflicts-at-hospitals [http://perma.cc/TN3T-
UDBE]). 
109 See Catholic Health Care in the United States, CATH. 
HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S. (Jan. 2017), https://www. 
chausa.org/about/about/facts-statistics [https://perma.cc/GE7B-
UNQJ] (indicating that 649 Catholic hospitals annually admit 
more than five million patients, provide 105 million outpatient 
visits, and receive more than twenty million emergency room 
visits). 
110 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2516. 
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with the force of law. The “social meaning” of revoking 
RFRA protections for pharmacists who do not wish to 
dispense abortifacients or adoption agencies which do not 
wish to place children with same-sex couples is clear: 
traditional views on contested sexual norms cannot be 
acted upon in public life. It sends a message that 
individuals with religiously motivated beliefs about 
sexual morality are not welcome in certain industries. 
(“No Evangelicals need apply.”) Indeed, if an individual 
does act upon her religious convictions and integrates her 
faith and work, the law will not shield her and may 
actually impose penalties for her divergence from the 
new political orthodoxy on sexual morality.  
Such a legal regime imposes a far greater stigma 
on religious believers than does the status quo on third 
parties seeking services. This is for two reasons. First, 
because the force of law would be used to actively 
penalize complicity-based refusals, this legal regime 
would be more coercive. Without robust RFRA 
protections, the law would directly disfavor religious 
individuals who hold traditional views by making their 
refusals illegal. The status quo minimizes coercion by 
permitting the religious actor to refuse or not, and by 
allowing the third party seeking services to select any 
other willing provider. Second, weakening or eliminating 
accommodations for complicity-based refusals has a 
pedagogical effect that stigmatizes religious actors who 
hold traditional views on sexual morality. Rather than 
remain neutral as between the religious objector and the 
third party and allowing both sides to retain maximal 
freedom to organize their affairs, such a rule would 
explicitly disfavor the religious objector.111 It would treat 
the dignitary interests of the third party as more worthy 
                                               
111 See supra note 65. 
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of legal solicitude. The “social meaning” of this favoritism 
would communicate that the religious objector has sinned 
by acting on her archaic moral beliefs. It would convey, 
in short, that she is a bigot.112 
Thus, using Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s 
reasoning and definition of dignitary harm, the religious 
objector is harmed at least as much (if not more) when 
accommodations are denied than the third party seeking 
services when accommodations are permitted. 
 
III. Accommodations Promote Social Peace 
 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel argue that 
accommodations for complicity-based religious objections 
will only prolong and intensify conflict over culture war 
issues.113 They argue that the “social logic” of “cross-
denominational mobilization”114 means politically active 
religious traditionalists will try “to enforce traditional 
morality in the law of abortion and marriage and to seek 
conscience-based exemptions from laws that depart from 
traditional morality.”115 Having lost the primary battle, 
traditionalists now use complicity-based claims as “a way 
                                               
112 It is commonly asserted that protections for religious 
freedom shelter bigotry. See, e.g., Valerie Tarico, Right-Wing 
Christianity Teaches Bigotry: The Ugly Roots of Indiana’s New 
Anti-Gay Law, SALON (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www. 
salon.com/2015/04/04/right_wing_christianity_teaches_bigotry
_the_ugly_roots_of_indianas_new_anti_gay_law_partner/ 
[https://perma.cc/BU6R-H5QZ] (describing a state RFRA law 
as motivated by “bigotry and homophobia”). Curtailing RFRA 
protections because of the “dignitary harms” imposed on third 
parties grants these accusations legal imprimatur. 
113 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2553–63 
(“[A]ccommodating religious exemption claims may not settle 
conflict, as many contend.”). 
114 Id. at 2544. 
115 Id. at 2548. 
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to continue conflict over community-wide norms in a new 
form.”116 Widespread healthcare refusal laws, for 
example, can be used to impede access to abortion117—
especially in areas dominated by religiously affiliated 
healthcare providers.118 Conscience protections for 
wedding vendors could be used “to forestall or restrict an 
antidiscrimination regime that includes sexual 
orientation.”119 Thus, religious accommodations 
perpetuate culture war rivalries that Professors NeJaime 
and Siegel would rather put an end to. 
Even if Professors NeJaime and Siegel are right 
that religious exemptions perpetuate culture war 
conflicts, there is no reasonable or equitable alternative. 
There is reason for hope, however, that accommodations 
can promote social peace rather than intensify conflict. 
 
A. No Reasonable Alternatives to 
Accommodation Exist 
 
No matter how much Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel wish that the culture wars would disappear if 
religious accommodations were curtailed, the reality is 
that crushing the “other side” will not work.120 This is 
                                               
116 Id. at 2553. 
117 Id. at 2555. 
118 Id. at 2557. 
119 Id. at 2564. 
120 See generally Girgis, supra note 65, at 413. Although 
NeJaime and Siegel may not be motivated by political 
vindictiveness, there is an undercurrent of victor’s justice 
present among opponents of religious accommodations. This 
attitude is best reflected by Professor Mark Tushnet, who 
wrote in a revealing and now infamous blog post: 
 
The culture wars are over; they lost, we won. . 
. . For liberals, the question now is how to deal 
with the losers in the culture wars. That’s 
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mostly a question of tactics. My own judgment 
is that taking a hard line (“You lost, live with 
it”) is better than trying to accommodate the 
losers . . . . Trying to be nice to the losers didn’t 
work well after the Civil War, nor after Brown. 
(And taking a hard line seemed to work 
reasonably well in Germany and Japan after 
1945.) I should note that LGBT activists in 
particular seem to have settled on the hard-line 
approach, while some liberal academics defend 
more accommodating approaches. . . . Of course 
all bets are off if Donald Trump becomes 
President. 
 
Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal 
Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2016, 1:15 PM), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-
crouch-liberal.html [https://perma.cc/DCW5-BZKU].  
 In a later clarification blog post, Tushnet noted that 
reactions to his post claimed that he believed religious 
objectors, especially in complicity cases, should be treated like 
defeated Confederates and Nazis: 
 
In the context I was writing about, for example, 
“taking a hard line” means opposing on both 
policy and constitutional grounds free-standing 
so-called “religious liberty” laws. . . . [T]he 
exemptions that might satisfy “our side” would 
have to be pretty narrow [including] . . . some 
sort of constraint on the exemptions’ 
availability in cases of claimed “complicity.” (I 
don’t know whether even these would be 
acceptable to activists on “our side.”) . . . [L]ike 
the Japanese soldiers who were stranded on 
islands in the Pacific and didn't know the war 
was over, so too many people on their side 
haven't yet come to terms with the fact that 
they lost the culture wars. 
 
Mark Tushnet, What Does “Taking a Hard Line” Mean?, 
BALKINIZATION (May 9, 2016, 8:28 PM), https://balkin. 
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because the clash runs deeper than the surface legal 
conflict between free exercise and nondiscrimination: it 
is a “conflict between two worldviews, both held with the 
intensity generally associated with religious belief.”121 
The most fundamental convictions about the nature of 
God, man, and morality are at stake. A take-no-prisoners 
legal approach is unlikely to change the deeply held 
beliefs of religious traditionalists who, as of yet, still 
constitute a sizable nationwide minority. This is 
especially true while conscience protections in complicity 
cases still enjoy substantial support.122 Subjecting 
sympathetic religious objectors to severe penalties and 
                                               
blogspot.com/2016/05/what-does-taking-hard-line-mean.html 
[https://perma.cc/G84Q-F77S]. 
121 See Statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow, supra note 101, 
at 43. 
122 See PEW RES. CTR., WHERE THE PUBLIC STANDS ON 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY VS. NONDISCRIMINATION 3 (2016) (finding 
that 30% of U.S. adults believe “[e]mployers who have a 
religious objection to the use of birth control should be . . . able 
to refuse to provide it in health insurance plans for their 
employees,” and that 48% believe “[b]usinesses that provide 
wedding services should be . . . able to refuse to provide those 
services to same-sex couples if the business owner has religious 
objections to homosexuality”); National Poll Shows Majority 
Support Healthcare Conscience Rights, Conscience Law, 
CHRISTIAN MED. ASS’N (May 2011), http://www. 
freedom2care.org/docLib/200905011_Pollingsummaryhandout
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D3Z-FS3T] (finding that 77% of U.S. 
adults believe healthcare professionals should not be “forced to 
participate in procedures or practices to which they have moral 
objections,” and that 50% support “a law under which federal 
agencies and other government bodies that receive federal 
funds could not discriminate against hospitals and health care 
professionals who decline to participate in abortions.”). 
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jail time may alienate those who would otherwise support 
socially liberal policies on abortion and LGBT issues.123  
Court rulings which are perceived to crush 
religious dissenters may unintentionally revive the 
specter of persecution (perhaps plausibly), leading 
disfavored religious objectors to cling more intensely to 
their beliefs.124 A hard line approach would socially 
exclude and marginalize religious objectors, driving 
many people of faith out of entire industries and 
segments of society.125 Indeed, activists demanding the 
                                               
123  PEW RES. CTR, supra note 122, at 5. (finding that 22% of 
U.S. adults sympathized with both sides of the contraceptive 
coverage issue, and that 18% of U.S. adults sympathized with 
both sides of the wedding vendor issue). 
124 See Bradford Richardson, Persecution of Christians is on the 
Rise, Americans Say, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2016, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/5/christians-
facing-increased-persecution-america-po/ [https://perma.cc/
FKA3-CGX8] (reporting that 63% of LifeWay survey 
respondents believe Christians face growing levels of 
persecution); see also Right Wing Watch Staff, The Persecution 
Complex: The Religious Right’s Deceptive Rallying Cry, RIGHT 
WING WATCH 2 (2014), http://files.rightwingwatch.org/uploads/ 
persecution_report_V2.pdf (“The religious persecution 
narrative is nothing new . . . but it has taken off in recent years 
in reaction to advances in gay rights and reproductive 
freedom.”); cf. Matthew 5:11 (New King James) (“Blessed are 
you when they . . . persecute you . . . for My sake.”). 
125 See Statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow, supra note 101, 
at 111 (“People who live in accordance with their unfashionable 
religious beliefs will be unable to work in many professions. 
When a baker or a photographer or a CEO is forced to 
participate in activities that offend their religious beliefs, what 
hope is there for a doctor, a counselor, a lawyer? Traditional 
believers will have very few careers where they can both make 
a living and live according to their faith. It is an unofficial form 
of the legal disabilities imposed on English Catholics following 
the Glorious Revolution.”); cf. Sohrab Ahmari, Sweden 
Blacklists an Antiabortion Midwife, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2017, 
126
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withdrawal of religious liberty protections may 
themselves be engaged in a form of social hostility toward 
religious groups that adhere to traditional moral 
beliefs.126 If “pluralist democracy is dynamic and 
fragile,”127 then maintaining it “depends on the 
commitment of all politically relevant groups to its 
processes. Political losers may exit the system unless 
they think their interests will be accommodated or their 
losses from exiting will exceed their gains.”128 This is a 
distinct danger because pluralistic democracy “needs 
emerging groups to commit to its processes just as much 
as it needs established groups to stick to those 
processes.”129 
Removing accommodations and imposing stiff 
penalties on religious objectors may also entrench 
resistance to ascendant sexual mores and foment social 
backlash. When courts aggressively implement a social 
agenda, it can be interpreted that the courts engage 
opponents more intensely than supporters, which could 
lead to political exploitation and widespread resistance to 
                                               
2:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-blacklists-an-
antiabortion-midwife-1491768904 [https://perma.cc/HF7Q-
AGDQ] (describing the legal and professional ostracism of a 
Swedish midwife who refuses to perform abortions). 
126 See, e.g., Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch, supra note 
120. 
127 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How 
Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of 
Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1294 (2005). 
128 Id. Eskridge adds, “Groups will disengage when they believe 
that participation in the system is pointless due to their 
permanent defeat on issues important to them . . . or when the 
political process imposes fundamental burdens on them or 
threatens their group identity or cohesion.” Id. at 1293. 
129 Id. at 1294. 
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that agenda.130 Widespread support for conscience 
exceptions in complicity cases, the deeply held nature of 
religious belief, and the backing of a major political party 
increases the likelihood of political backlash. The 
elimination of accommodations in complicity cases is 
unlikely to dampen the flame of cultural contests. Not 
only are these conflicts inevitable, they may even be 
desirable when properly channeled.131 
Since “total war” tactics are deleterious to social 
cohesion, living in a sharply divided pluralistic society 
requires both accommodation of religious believers and 
respect for those who do not share their moralistic views. 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s explanation that 
complicity claims are unique in their “social logic” is 
inadequate. Even if religious accommodations are 
sometimes used “to enforce traditional norms against 
those who do not share their beliefs”132 rather than to 
“preserv[e] space for distinctive religious beliefs and 
                                               
130 See Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage 
Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 148–51 
(2013); see also Neal Devins, I Love You, Big Brother, 87 CAL. 
L. REV. 1283, 1297 (1999) (remarking on “the disastrous 
backlash that occurred in the wake of Roe v. Wade”); Michael 
J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The 
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). Professor Siegel, 
while acknowledging destructive aspects of backlash, believes 
that it nonetheless has redeeming and socially beneficial 
qualities. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic 
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
373, 388–91 (2007). 
131 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 101, at 214 
(testimony of Marc O. DeGirolami) (“Conflict is an essential 
and deep feature of our society—both unavoidable and actually 
desirable, since its source is our different backgrounds, 
different outlooks, and different memories.”). 
132 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2591. 
128
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol12/iss2/1
COMPLICITY-BASED RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS 
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 233 (2018) 
 
 
[279] 
practices,”133 this use is no more injurious to pluralism 
than the proposal for which Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel advocate. On balance, offering robust protections 
for religious objectors is more likely to contribute to a 
diverse public square.134 
Rather than viewing social conflict as “a barely 
contained threat to individual rights and peaceful 
coexistence”135 and “evincing skepticism that shared life 
is at all possible between groups locked in intractable 
conflict,”136 skeptics of religious accommodations should 
embrace what Professor John Inazu calls, confident 
pluralism.137 This approach calls both religious believers 
and skeptics alike to acknowledge that “shared existence 
is not only possible, but also necessary.”138 According to 
Inazu, both sides should accept a constitutional 
commitment to both inclusion (that we are continually 
reshaping the boundaries of our political community)139 
and dissent (that even as we work to extend and 
                                               
133 Id. at 2590. 
134 See Ryan T. Anderson, The Defense of Marriage Isn’t Over, 
PUB. DISCOURSE (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www. 
thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/10/13889 [http://perma.cc/UA54-
7EH5] (“Protecting religious liberty and the rights of 
conscience is the embodiment of a principled pluralism that 
fosters a more diverse civil sphere. Indeed, tolerance is 
essential to promoting peaceful coexistence even amid 
disagreement.”). 
135 Girgis, supra note 65, at 413. 
136 See id. (suggesting that the “honest Rousseauian fear that 
“[i]t is impossible to live at peace with those whom we regard 
as damned” motivates the quest to retract religious 
accommodations (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT 122 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin ed., 
1968) (1762)). 
137 JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM (2016). 
138 Id. at 6. Professor Inazu adds that confident pluralism “does 
not suppress or ignore conflict—it invites it.” Id. at 7. 
139 Id. at 15–16. 
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renegotiate these boundaries, we recognize the freedom 
of citizens in the voluntary groups of civil society to differ 
from established norms).140 Although neither of these 
principles are absolute, they can help foster a modest 
agreement on the individual rights of both parties. 
Rather than seeking to impose their own orthodoxy, both 
sides must allow room for mutual toleration.141  
Confident pluralism also proposes a civic 
aspiration of “living speech,” which prioritizes dialogue 
and persuasion over combativeness and coercion. 142 Both 
traditionalists and advocates clamoring for the 
withdrawal of conscience protections would do well to 
recall the Court’s advice to the Texans who proscribed 
flag desecration: “The way to preserve the flag’s special 
role is not to punish those who feel differently about these 
matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong.”143 
 
B. Private Ordering and Markets Mitigate 
Social Conflict 
 
Rather than using the coercive force of law to 
impose a new orthodoxy on matters of sexual politics, 
private ordering—guided by principles of confident 
pluralism144—should be allowed to flourish. Market-
                                               
140 Id. at 16. 
141 Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 735 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Tolerance 
is a two-way street. Otherwise, the rule mandates orthodoxy, 
not anti-discrimination.”). 
142 INAZU, supra note 137, at 101. 
143 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989). 
144 Professor Inazu affirms that “[b]oycotts, strikes, and 
protests against private actors are in most cases compatible 
with confident pluralism,” but warns that “[w]hen we engage 
in these forms of collective action, we should bear in mind the 
civic aspirations of tolerance, humility, and patience.” See 
supra note 137, at 115. 
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based systems, which permit businesses and civil society 
groups to shape social norms, are preferable to a 
compulsory legal approach that eliminates 
accommodations for religious objectors.145 Rather than 
impose a uniform orthodoxy on society about contested 
moral issues, “subsidiary institutions [should] hav[e] 
spheres of private ordering that allow them to organically 
. . . come to their own conclusions about those contested 
matters.”146 
Civic organizations—whether motivated by profit 
or conviction—have already begun to develop their own 
approaches to navigating conflicts between religious 
liberty and issues of gender, sexuality, and reproduction. 
For example, the popular room-rental service Airbnb 
recently adopted a policy prohibiting all of its users from 
discriminating on the basis of “sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or marital status.”147 Airbnb’s policy shapes 
social norms by excluding many religious traditionalists 
                                               
145 See Adam J. MacLeod, Tempering Civil Rights Conflicts: 
Common Law for the Moral Marketplace, 2016 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 643, 672 (2016) (arguing that laws impinging on religious 
liberty “do not leave space for mediating conflicts between 
actors within the domains of private ordering. Instead, they 
turn all important questions into zero-sum contests and raise 
the stakes even higher”); id. at 679–80 (observing that when 
civic goods “require cooperation for their realization, legal 
coercion destroys both the economic and the moral value of 
those plural practices and institutions of private ordering.”). 
146 Michael P. Moreland, Religious Freedom and 
Discrimination, 4 J. CHRISTIAN LEGAL THOUGHT 10 (2014). 
147 See Airbnb’s Nondiscrimination Policy: Our Commitment to 
Inclusion and Respect, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ 
help/article/1405/airbnb-s-nondiscrimination-policy--our-
commitment-to-inclusion-and-respect [https://perma.cc/495K-
2DZ2] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
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from using its service.148 But religious traditionalists 
remain at liberty to use other online room-rental services, 
or to set up their own service that complies with the 
dictates of conscience. Ride-hailing services such as Uber 
and Lyft prohibit both drivers and passengers from 
discriminating on the basis of “sexual orientation or 
gender identity.”149 If for some reason a religious objector 
refused to use Uber on that basis, they would remain free 
to hail a taxi or launch their own ride-hailing service. 
Boycotts can serve a similar purpose, so long as 
they are used to “represent[] minority viewpoints against 
majoritarian norms” rather than “harness[] majoritarian 
power to squelch dissenting viewpoints.”150 Most 
                                               
148 Users who decline “won’t be able to host or book using 
Airbnb” and are invited to close their accounts. General 
questions about the Airbnb Community Commitment, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1523/general-questions-
about-the-airbnb-community-commitment [https://perma.cc/
8AJN-JWF5] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
149 Ben Wear, Uber, Lyft Say Policies Ban Discrimination 
Based on Sexual Orientation, AUSTIN AM-STATESMAN (Apr. 24, 
2017), http://www.statesman.com/news/transportation/uber-
lyft-say-policies-ban-discrimination-based-sexual-
orientation/eWDh5e48iN3OXCBP1rmDEM/ [https://perma.cc/
PJK3-VFNM]; Uber Non-Discrimination Policy, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/legal/policies/non-discrimination-policy/
en/ [https://perma.cc/8JKY-X6LT] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017) 
(prohibiting “discrimination on the basis of discrimination 
against riders or drivers based on . . . sexual orientation, . . . 
marital status, [or] gender identity”). Violators “lose access to 
the Uber platform.” Id. 
150 See INAZU, supra note 137, at 107; see also Ross Douthat, 
The Case of Brendan Eich, N.Y. TIMES: EVALUATIONS (Apr. 8, 
2014), https://nyti.ms/2mpxYAr (“[Although] a healthy 
pluralism inevitably involves community norms and 
community policing in some form, I suspect that an elite 
culture that enforces the new norms on marriage this strictly, 
and polices its own ranks this rigorously, is likely to find 
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consumer boycotts—such as those against Target, Chick-
fil-A, and Hobby Lobby151—“occur in reasonably 
pluralistic settings.”152 Others forms of collective action, 
which resemble witch-hunting more than constructive 
norm-shaping, might violate the principles of 
pluralism.153 
Instances of market-driven norm-shaping are 
healthy insofar as they seek to nudge attitudes and 
behaviors rather than coerce them. If businesses such as 
Airbnb and Uber can use market power to express their 
views and influence public opinion (even when doing so 
imposes material or “dignitary harms” on third parties), 
why not ChristianMingle when its core religious beliefs 
                                               
reasons (and, indeed, is already adept at finding them) to 
become increasingly anti-pluralist whenever it has the chance 
to enforce those same norms on society as a whole.”). 
151 See, e.g., Hayley Peterson, The Target Boycott Cost More 
than Anyone Expected — and the CEO was Blindsided, BUS. 
INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/target-
ceo-blindsided-by-boycott-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/T32U-XRSJ] 
(describing the effects of a boycott related to Target’s 
transgender restroom policy); Editorial, Progressives Against 
Lunch, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/progressives-against-lunch-1462744747 [https:// 
perma.cc/LCC9-K52H] (describing both boycotts and counter-
boycotts of Chick-Fil-A); Trudy Ring, Here’s Why George Takei 
Wants You to Boycott Hobby Lobby, ADVOCATE (July 2, 2014), 
http://www.advocate.com/politics/2014/07/02/heres-why-
george-takei-wants-you-boycott-hobby-lobby [https://perma.cc/
E6YG-C4M3]. 
152 INAZU, supra note 137, at 113. 
153 See, e.g., Mary Bowerman, Indiana Pizza Shop that Won’t 
Cater Gay Weddings to Close, USA TODAY (Apr. 1, 2015), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/04/01/
indiana-family-pizzeria-wont-cater-gay-weddings/70813430/ 
[https://perma.cc/VA7N-3KVS] (describing how journalists 
baited a small, rural pizza parlor into saying that it would not 
serve same-sex weddings and how, as a result, the parlor was 
overwhelmed by threatening messages and forced to close). 
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are implicated?154 Why not religious business owners—
such as florists, bakers, and pharmacists? By the same 
principle, civic institutions with religious commitments 
should be accommodated so that they may set their own 
codes of conduct when possible. Private ordering can 
alleviate social tensions when its structures embody 
“tolerance, humility, and patience”155 rather than 
exacerbate division. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Complicity is a long-established concept in our 
legal tradition. It neither operates differently in the 
context of religious liberty claims, nor does it deserve the 
law’s special disfavor. The third-party harm theory 
exaggerates complicity’s perceived differences from other 
religious liberty claims and invents its own novel concept 
of “dignitary harms,” which has never before been 
countenanced in First Amendment jurisprudence. Even 
if the third-party harm theory were coherent and 
cognizable, its current formulation regrettably excludes 
the material and dignitary harms that would be imposed 
on religious objectors should accommodations be 
narrowed or revoked. In other words, “dignitary harm” is 
a two-edged sword. Eliminating religious 
accommodations in these situations is unlikely to foster 
social peace.  
                                               
154 See Jacob Gershman & Sara Randazzo, ChristianMingle 
Opens Doors to Gay Singles Under Settlement, WALL ST. J.: L. 
BLOG (June 30, 2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/06/30/ 
christianmingle-com-opens-doors-to-gay-singles-under-
settlement/ (reporting that ChristianMingle has agreed to 
permit same-sex matches after settling a discrimination 
lawsuit). 
155 INAZU, supra note 137, at 83. 
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Thus, instead of using the coercive force of law to 
censor expressive conduct and to lock-in the gains of the 
sexual revolution, market-based systems and private 
ordering should be allowed to take their course. If we are 
to have a truly diverse and pluralistic public square, 
there must be consideration for both religious actors and 
third parties. That includes robust accommodations for 
religious objectors in complicity cases. Perhaps most 
importantly, it includes a posture of humility and mutual 
respect. 
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COMMENT 
 
THE ILLUSORY CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION OF “NO 
TRESPASSING” SIGNS IN 
TENNESSEE 
STATE V. CHRISTENSEN, 517 S.W.3D 60 (TENN. 2017). 
 
Rainey Lankford* 
 
In State v. Christensen,1 the Tennessee Supreme 
Court decided whether police officers violated the 
defendant’s constitutional right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures when the officers entered the 
defendant’s property despite the presence of “No 
Trespassing” signs. The court ruled that the officers’ 
entrance did not constitute a violation of the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.2 Thus, the court upheld the ruling 
of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, stating that 
“No Trespassing” signs, alone, do not prohibit officers 
                                               
* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, The University of Tennessee 
College of Law. B.A., Psychology, Lipscomb University, 2014, 
cum laude. I would like to thank Dean Melanie Wilson, Dean 
& Lindsay Young Distinguished Professor of Law at The 
University of Tennessee College of Law, for her instruction and 
guidance in the study of criminal procedure. 
1 517 S.W.3d 60, 68–69 (Tenn. 2017). 
2 Id. at 63–64. 
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from coming onto the curtilage of a home to conduct a 
consensual knock-and-talk encounter. Therefore, the 
ruling by the trial court, finding the defendant guilty, 
was upheld.3  
 On August 3, 2013, two narcotics investigators 
responded to a tip regarding a pseudoephedrine 
purchase.4 The tip eventually led them to the defendant’s 
home, which had a gravel driveway.5 Two “No 
Trespassing” signs were posted at the entrance to the 
driveway.6 Further, there were no physical obstructions 
preventing entrance to the driveway.7 The defendant 
came out to meet the investigators as they approached 
his porch.8 When the defendant opened the door, the 
investigators smelled the distinct odor that comes with 
the production of methamphetamine.9 The officers then 
spoke to the defendant and asked for consent to search 
his home.10 The defendant told the investigators that he 
had done nothing illegal and would not consent to the 
search.11 At this point, the investigators determined that, 
due to the present exigent circumstances (namely the 
volatile nature of the chemicals used in 
methamphetamine production), they had to enter the 
home to investigate further.12 One investigator forced 
open the locked door to the home and began searching.13 
This initial entry led to the discovery of a 
methamphetamine lab and several firearms.14  
                                               
3 Id. at 79. 
4 Id. at 64. 
5 Id. at 65. 
6 Id. at 67. 
7 Id. at 64. 
8 Id. at 65. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 66. 
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At trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence gathered as a result of the warrantless 
search of his home, claiming that the presence of a “No 
Trespassing” sign meant that a warrant was required to 
enter his property.15 The defendant’s motion was denied 
and he was convicted of five separate criminal charges.16 
Later, on direct appeal, the defendant contended that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
evidence found within his home.17 Conducting de novo 
review, the court of appeals determined that the growing 
legal consensus was that “the implied invitation of the 
front door can be revoked but that the revocation must be 
obvious to the casual visitor who wishes only to contact 
the residents of a property.”18 Based on this 
determination, the court of appeals found the presence of 
a mere “No Trespassing” sign insufficient to revoke any 
aforementioned implied invitation.19 
 On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court began 
its review by affirming the rights enshrined in the federal 
and state constitutions forbidding warrantless searches 
of homes and specific Fourth Amendment protections 
against searches on the curtilage of one’s home.20 The 
court pointed out, however, that not every police 
interaction on the curtilage of one’s home constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.21 Citing the U.S. 
                                               
15 State v. Christensen, No. W2014-00931-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 
Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 357, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 
2015). 
16 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 63. 
17 Christensen, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 357, at *7. 
18 Id. at *13 (citing State v. Grice, 767 S.E.2d 312, 319 (N.C. 
2015)). 
19 Id. 
20 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 68–69 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. 
IV; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7). The court here “assume[d][] 
without deciding” that the driveway was part of the curtilage 
of the defendant’s home. Id. at 69. 
21 Id. at 69. 
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Florida v. Jardines,22 the court 
recognized the right of police officers to approach the 
curtilage of a home under “knock-and-talk” rules.23 It was 
further established that “knock-and-talk” interactions 
are not considered searches under the Fourth 
Amendment; therefore, the question became whether the 
defendant had revoked this implied invitation to “knock-
and-talk.”24  
 The issue of whether “No Trespassing” signs are 
enough to revoke any implied license to “knock-and-talk” 
has been the subject of many state and federal cases.25 
However, the majority of states have found that such 
signs were not enough revoke an implied license to 
“knock-and-talk.”26 The court specifically noted State v. 
Rigoulot,27 which stated that “No Trespassing” signs 
“cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude normal, 
legitimate inquiries.”28 In order to determine when a “No 
Trespassing” sign may be reasonably interpreted to 
forbid “knock-and-talk” situations, the court turned to 
the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Carloss.29 The 
court specifically pointed to a concurring opinion in 
Carloss, in which Chief Judge Tymkovich said that the 
                                               
22 Id. at 69–70 (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 
1415–16 (2013) (holding that while police officers have a 
license to approach the home and knock, if they are engaging 
in conduct that is clearly a search, around the curtilage, any 
such evidence gathered as a result should be suppressed)). 
23 Id. at 70 (citing State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 2003)). 
24 Id. (citing Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417–18). 
25 Id. at 72 (citing cases). 
26 Id. at 73 (citing cases). 
27 846 P.2d 918, 923 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (stating that “No 
Trespassing” signs are not enough to forbid normal legitimate 
requests, and that police officers do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment if they enter the curtilage under these 
circumstances). 
28 Id. at 923. 
29 818 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 2016).  
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legal standard to be applied in these cases should be 
whether a reasonable person, under a totality of the 
circumstances, would view a “No Trespassing” sign as 
something that would place any bearing on one’s ability 
to go up to the curtilage of the home and knock.30 The 
Tennessee Supreme Court adopted this totality of the 
circumstances standard.31 In examining the totality of 
the circumstances in the defendant’s case, the court 
determined that the simple presence of  “No Trespassing” 
signs did not suffice to deter officers from approaching 
the curtilage of his home.32 The court suggested, however, 
that if the defendant’s driveway had been blocked by a 
locked gate or a fence, then it would have been more clear 
to the officers that any license to approach the home had 
been revoked.33 No such barrier existed in the 
defendant’s case.34 Based on this determination, the 
court found that the defendant had no expectation of 
privacy in regards to individuals approaching his home.35  
Thus, the ruling of the trial court was upheld.36 
 The dissent rebuffed the court’s assertion that it 
might take a locked fence or gate for a citizen to invoke 
his Fourth Amendment rights.37 In writing the dissent, 
Justice Sharon Lee pointed out that the court’s physical 
barriers standard would leave poorer citizens without the 
means to invoke their rights.38 Justice Lee further stated 
that “No Trespassing” signs clearly state the property 
owner’s desire to not have visitors.39 Many other 
                                               
30 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 74–75 (citing Carloss, 818 F.3d 
at 999–1000). 
31 Id. at 75. 
32 Id. at 75–76. 
33 Id. at 78–79. 
34 Id. at 76–77. 
35 Id. at 78. 
36 Id. at 79. 
37 Id. (Lee, J., dissenting). 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 80. 
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jurisdictions have taken such a stance.40 One such 
example is People v. Scott,41 where the New York Court of 
Appeals declared that physical barriers and/or 
appropriate signage was enough to make clear that entry 
was not permitted by the property owner.42 However, the 
dissent also considered the totality of the circumstances 
standard set forth by the court.43 Justice Lee contended 
that, even under the totality of the circumstances 
standard, the defendant made it clear that he wanted no 
visitors.44 Justice Lee argued that while the majority 
claimed it was applying a totality of the circumstances 
standard, it failed to actually weigh the significance of 
the signs.45 Citing a case from the Maryland Court of 
Appeals, Justice Lee contended that the presence of two 
clearly visible “No Trespassing” signs was enough to 
make it clear to the investigators that no one was 
welcome to approach the home.46 Justice Lee also argued 
that because the defendant had made clear that no one 
was welcome on his property, he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy on his curtilage, and those 
expectations were violated by the warrantless intrusion 
by the investigators.47 
 Christensen will have an effect on homeowners 
across the state of Tennessee by raising the bar for what 
revokes the implied invitation for individuals to approach 
the curtilage of their home and knock. Now, Tennesseans 
must utilize a physical barrier, such as a locked fence or 
gate, to put the public on notice that unsolicited visitors 
are not welcome to approach their home. While this 
                                               
40 See, e.g., id. at 80–81 (citing cases). 
41 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1338 (N.Y. 1992). 
42 Id.  
43 Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 82 (Lee, J., dissenting). 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id. (citing Jones v. State, 943 A.2d 1, 12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2008)). 
47 Id. at 83. 
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ruling follows most other jurisdictions in making physical 
barriers the standard for revocation of the implied 
invitation to “knock-and-talk,” it still leaves some 
questions. One such question is whether such a rule will 
create a burden on lower income households that wish to 
invoke their Fourth Amendment rights.48 It will be 
important to follow future cases to see if there are any 
disparities based on income. Another question is how 
other courts will treat the varying rulings taken by 
jurisdictions on this issue. While most jurisdictions have 
adopted the same rule as Tennessee, others have chosen 
the alternative.49 Until there is a significant divergence 
on this issue in the federal courts, however, this area of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will likely remain one 
governed by jurisdiction-specific rules. 
 
 
 
                                               
48 See id. at 79. 
49 Id. at 80. 
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